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The patent portfolio theory thus explains what is known as “the patent 
paradox”:  in recent years patent intensity—patents obtained per research and 
development dollar—has risen dramatically even as the expected value of indi-
vidual patents has diminished.  We find the benefits of patent portfolios to be so 
significant as to suggest that firms’ patenting decisions are largely unrelated to 
the expected value of individual patents; because patent portfolios simultane-
ously increase both the scale and the diversity of available marketplace protec-
tions for innovations, firms will typically seek to obtain a large quantity of re-
lated patents, rather than evaluating their actual worth.  The result—which we 
find widely recognized in commercial circles—is that the modern patenting en-
vironment exhibits (and requires) a high-volume, portfolio-based approach that 
is at odds with scholars’ traditional assumptions. 
The implications of the portfolio theory of patents are important and wide-
spread.  First, the explanatory power of the theory allows resolution not only of 
the patent paradox, but also of many of the otherwise puzzling observable pat-
terns in the modern patenting environment, such as firm-size differences in pat-
ent intensity and litigation rates.  Second, the patent portfolio theory neatly 
complements the prior theories that have sought to explain modern patent 
value, strengthening their relationship with the reality of patenting behavior, 
and confirming that the value of patents has expanded beyond traditionalist 
notions.  Third, the patent portfolio theory offers a number of important predic-
tive insights into future trends in the patent system, allowing policymakers and 
scholars to frame their inquiry within a range of likely outcomes.  In our analy-
sis, the patent portfolio theory does not suggest a better, brighter future for the 
patent system, but does build a foundation for the important academic and pol-
icy-related work that springs from this initial treatment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is the value of patents?  This deceptively simple question has 
occupied a generation of patent scholars and policy-makers, because 
the modern patent system presents a seemingly insoluble puzzle.1  On 
1 A few notable examples of the scholarly inquiry into patent value include 
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill 
eds., 2003) (analyzing the effects of the patent examination process on patent quality, 
durability, and the patent marketplace); KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, 
REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:  UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS (2000) (offer-
ing advice about how to wield patents and compete in the intellectual property arena); 
Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited:  An Empirical 
Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 
125 (2001) (examining the multifaceted effects on semiconductor firms of strengthen-
ing patent rights); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition:  Policy Innovation 
and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531 (2000) (reviewing the changes in patent 
policy during the past two decades and the theoretical literature related to the ex-
pected effects of such changes); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, What Is Behind the Re-
cent Surge in Patenting?, 28 RES. POL’Y 1 (1999) (explaining the large increase in patent-
ing during the 1990s); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987) (inquir-
ing into the nature of appropriability conditions in over one hundred manufacturing 
industries); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (focusing on 
patents as a means for credibly publicizing information); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and 
Innovation:  An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) (investigating the effects of 
the patent system by firms on the rate of development and commercialization of inven-
tions); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (analyzing the economic effects of patent scope); Ariel 
Pakes, On Patents, R & D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return, 93 J. POL. ECON. 390 
(1985) (investigating the relationship between the number of patent applications, 
R&D expenditures, and the stock market value of firms); Mark Schankerman, How 
Valuable Is Patent Protection?  Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1998) 
(presenting evidence on the value of patent rights in France); F.M. Scherer, The Inno-
vation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. 
eds., 2001) (showing wide disparities in the relative growth of investments in technol-
ogy companies); Wesley M. Cohen, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:  Appropriability Con-
ditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 
(indicating that firms often patent for reasons beyond profiting from a patented inno-
vation). 
 Very current examples of this general inquiry include:  Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents (Stanford Law School, Olin Working Paper No. 288, 2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=567883 (discussing the implications of the low and uncer-
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the one hand, the amount of patenting activity has dramatically in-
creased in recent years.2  On the other hand, all available evidence 
demonstrates that the average expected value of a patent is extremely 
small (and likely negative when acquisition costs are considered):  the 
overwhelming majority of patents have no value whatsoever, and of 
those that have value, it is nearly impossible to determine ex ante.3  
These enduring and simultaneous facts fundamentally challenge the 
conventional understanding of the patent system as a generator of in-
centives to invent:  if patents on inventions have little or no expected 
economic value, why do individuals and commercial corporations pat-
ent so heavily?4  Or, if patents are valuable after all, where does their 
value lie?  We refer to this puzzle (as do others) as the patent paradox.5
In this Article, we develop a comprehensive theory of patent value:  
the portfolio theory of patents.  The portfolio theory both puts to rest 
the patent paradox and explains the salient characteristics of the 
modern patent system.  At the core of the portfolio theory lies the in-
sight that for patents, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  The 
true value of patents inheres not in their individual worth, but in their 
tain value of individual patents); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents (George Mason 
Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 04-29, 2004), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=566941 (noting the low value of most individual patents and exploring com-
mon attributes among abandoned patents). 
2 See infra Part I.A for a full discussion of the growth in patenting activity.  As a 
general matter, patent filings rose about 40% during the period 1998-2003.  See infra 
Table 1.  Patent intensity—the measure of patents obtained per research and devel-
opment dollar—approximately doubled from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s.  See, e.g., 
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 30 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & 
Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (explaining the rapid increase in patents per research and 
development dollar over this fifteen-year period). 
3 See infra Part I.A for a full discussion of the low average expected value of pat-
ents; see also infra Table 2 for data on this point.  In broad strokes, we note that em-
pirical studies find the average value of a patent to be in the range of about $7,500 to 
$25,000, which is generally less than average acquisition costs.  See, e.g., Schankerman, 
supra note 1, at 93-94.  Furthermore, most estimates suggest that less than 5% of pat-
ents have any apparent value at all—less than 1% are litigated (and these are found 
invalid at a rate of about 50%)—and only a small additional number are licensed.  See 
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 
(2001) (“[A] relatively small percentage of the 150,000 or so patents issued each year 
are actually licensed to third parties in exchange for royalties.”). 
4 While the number of patents issued to individuals has risen significantly, the sub-
stantial growth during the last fifteen years is overwhelmingly due to the number of 
patents issued to corporations; the number issued to the United States government has 
remained relatively constant.  See generally U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTS (1991-2003). 
5 See, e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 125 (examining the patenting behavior 
of semiconductor firms).  See generally infra Part I for empirical documentation of the 
patent paradox. 
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aggregation into a collection of related patents—a patent portfolio.6  
The benefits of patent portfolios are of such significance, we show, 
that firms’ patenting decisions are largely unrelated to the expected 
value of individual patents.7  Rational firms will therefore typically 
seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than evaluat-
ing their individual worth.8  The result is that the modern innovation 
environment exhibits (and requires) a high-volume, portfolio-based 
approach to the patent system that is at odds with conventional schol-
arly assumptions. 
It is important to note at the outset that we are not the first to 
identify the existence of patent portfolios, nor are we the first to coin 
this term.  These are not the contributions we claim.  Rather, the con-
tribution of this Article is in the molding of the sporadic and disperse 
discussions of the phenomenon of patent portfolios into a consistent 
and full-blown theory of patent value, which we then use to explain 
the modern patent system and predict future trends. 
Our patent portfolio theory thus extends well beyond recent ef-
forts by academics to address the patent paradox by positing alterna-
tive views of patent value.9  These approaches either suffer from as-
sumptions that individual patents efficiently convey meaningful 
information (when in fact the evidence of vanishingly low patent val-
ues undermines this premise), or posit a generalized alternative utility 
for patents that does not fully fit the actual facts of the modern patent 
system.10  For example, we note that while suggestions that patents act 
as “signals” of qualities about the invention or the firm or as useful 
metrics of internal firm measurement and management have intuitive 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See id. 
8 See infra Part II.C. 
9 We note four major alternative theories:  (1) the signaling theory, which posits 
that patents cheaply provide valuable information about the invention or the firm; see, 
e.g., Long, supra note 1, at 625 (presenting a model of patents as a signaling mecha-
nism); (2) the internal metric theory, which suggests that individual patents are useful 
tools for the measurement of performance within firms; see, e.g., Richard C. Levin, A 
New Look at the Patent System, 76 AM. ECON. REV., May 1986, at 199, 201 (proposing that 
patents may be used to measure the performance of research and development em-
ployees); (3) the lottery theory, which analogizes a patent to a lottery ticket, with a very 
small chance of a very large payoff; see, e.g., Scherer, supra note 1, at 11 (demonstrating 
that among patent recipients, a “minority of ‘spectacular winners’ appropriate the 
lion’s share of total rewards”); and (4) the defensive patenting theory, where patents 
are obtained to counter other patents; see, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 1504 (“[T]here 
is anecdotal evidence that at least among high-technology and startup companies, the 
primary purpose of patents is defensive.”).  We discuss the shortcomings of these theo-
ries in detail in Part I.B. 
10 See infra Part I.B. 
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appeal, they prompt serious questions about what, exactly, is the in-
formation conveyed by individual patents.11  Put another way, if (as all 
available studies confirm) most individual patents have little or no 
value, then why is information about individual patents valuable?  
More generally, why would the market—or anyone else for that mat-
ter—care about information pertaining to a relatively valueless com-
modity?12
As we will show, the patent paradox disappears once patents are 
analyzed at the portfolio level.13  The holder of a patent portfolio real-
izes an array of strategic advantages—offensive and defensive—that 
are simply not otherwise available.14  We establish a two-category 
framework for understanding these benefits.  First, by combining the 
“right to exclude” of many closely related patents, a patent portfolio 
greatly increases the effective scale—the total scope of protection in 
the marketplace—beyond that of a collection of differentiated pat-
ents.15  That is, a well-conceived patent portfolio operates much like a 
“super-patent”; its scale-effects mean that a holder wields otherwise-
unattainable market power in a particular technological field.  This 
marketplace heft has a number of crucial impacts, including (1) eas-
ing subsequent innovation by broadening the scope of effective patent 
protection; (2) attracting related external innovations by virtue of the 
enhanced power to exclude others from the marketplace; (3) avoid-
ing costly litigation by greatly increasing the likelihood that alleged 
11 See id. 
12 In addition, we reject the possibility that the patent paradox is merely an exam-
ple of bounded rationality. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (arguing that non-
drafting parties to contracts are boundedly rational decision makers, and only take 
into account a limited number of product attributes as part of their purchase deci-
sion); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry:  Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal 
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 561-63 (2002) (highlighting the ways in which competi-
tive forces facilitate bounded rationality in the marketplace).  The major drivers of the 
recent increases in patenting activity are medium-to-large corporations, whose opera-
tions are marked by careful and highly sophisticated decision making.  Furthermore, 
they operate in a competitive environment that is quite unforgiving of long-term irra-
tional behavior.  For example, IBM, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard are among the Dow 30 
component companies that have consistently ranked among the top patent recipients 
in recent years.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Re-
leases Annual List of Top 10 Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 12, 
2004), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/04-01.htm (ranking IBM, 
Intel, and Hewlett-Packard as numbers one, seven, and five, respectively, for number of 
patents received in 2003).  For further discussion, see infra Part I.A. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra Part II.B. 
15 See infra Part II.B.1. 
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infringers and (even more importantly) putative plaintiffs in in-
fringement actions will be forced off the market; (4) improving the 
holder’s bargaining positions with competitors and third-parties alike; 
(5) enhancing the defensive aspects of patent protection by providing 
a far more credible threat of counter-infringement litigation; and (6) 
increasing the holder’s voice in the dynamic political economy of the 
patent system.16
Second, while the scale-effects of patent portfolios alone are of 
immense importance to firms in the modern economy, patent portfo-
lios offer yet another and no less important advantage:  diversity.17  
That is, while patent portfolios may at times function as “super-
patents,” they are nonetheless constructed from an array of distinct-
but-related individual patents, thus offering holders many of the well-
known benefits of asset diversification in addition to market power.18  
The diversity-effects of patent portfolios mean that, among other 
benefits, holders can (1) effectively address future uncertainties re-
lated to technological development, market conditions, and competi-
tor moves by offering a much broader array of protected subject mat-
ter; (2) expand the scope of the research and development inquiry 
into areas adjacent to the main path of research, thus maximizing 
technological opportunity; and (3) increase the long-term predictabil-
ity of and confidence in holders’ exclusionary rights by minimizing 
the consequences of many of the current uncertainties inherent in the 
patent law itself.19
We demonstrate that the advantages of patent portfolios are well-
recognized in commercial circles, cutting across both technological 
fields and firm sizes.20  While large firms provide perhaps the most 
compelling example of patent portfolios in practice—for example, 
since the mid-1990s, IBM has avowedly followed a portfolio-focused 
patenting strategy, which yielded a more than 400% increase in pat-
ent-related revenues (to about $1.5 billion, or about a quarter of total 
corporate receipts) even as the research and development budget was 
slashed21—we also find real world case studies of patenting behavior 
consistent with our theory among startups and acquisition-centric 
firms.22  Indeed, the rise of patent portfolios in the business commu-
16 See id. 
17 See infra Part II.B.2. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See infra notes 107-26 and sources cited therein. 
21 See infra Part III.B (IBM case study). 
22 See infra Part III.A (Qualcomm case study); Part III.C (Gemstar case study). 
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nity has become so significant that portfolios have become the credo 
of firm value in the modern innovation environment.23
The implications of the patent portfolio theory for scholars and 
policymakers are quite significant.  First and foremost, this Article 
stakes out a new path for future research concerning the patent sys-
tem.  In particular, it suggests that scholars should go beyond the 
strict focus on individual patents and devote greater attention to pat-
ent portfolios and their implications.  At a minimum, the introduction 
of the portfolio theory requires a careful reevaluation of the incentive 
effects of patents, patenting strategies, and patent valuation tech-
niques.  For example, we show, contrary to conventional wisdom, that 
firms do not necessarily base their patenting decisions on cost-benefit 
analyses of individual patents.  Rather, firms will continue to obtain 
patents as long as the marginal increase in value of the portfolio from 
an additional patent is greater than the acquisition cost of that patent; 
estimates of an individual patent’s value independent of a portfolio 
often do not enter the equation.24
Furthermore, the patent portfolio theory provides a unifying 
framework that can neatly incorporate prior scholarly contributions.25  
For example, patents do appear to have signaling effects at the portfo-
lio level, even though their significance is slightly different from what 
extant analysis suggests.26  Additionally, the portfolio theory recog-
nizes that some individual patents may be of great independent value 
to their inventors.  It suggests, however, that inventors can increase 
the value of such patents by constructing a portfolio around them.  
Finally, the oft-discussed defensive theories of patent value are greatly 
enhanced by understanding them in the context of substantial patent 
portfolios.27
The patent portfolio theory also enables a number of important 
predictions about the future course of the patent system.28  We predict 
that patent intensity (patents obtained per R&D dollar) will continue 
to be high, that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) will face in-
creasing pressure as a result, that patent “thickets” will proliferate and 
23 See infra Part II. 
24 Indeed, if there is any relationship between individual value and patent activity, 
we note that it will be inverse:  as the average expected value of individual patents 
drops, patenting activity will increase, as firms are increasingly forced to rely on portfo-
lio-based strategies to achieve any patent-related advantages.  See infra Part II.C. 
25 See infra Part IV.B. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See infra Part IV.C. 
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become a growing policy concern, and that patent litigation will be-
come more complex and costly.29  We also conclude that the portfolio-
dominated patent system will have serious distributional conse-
quences, where large, resource-rich, incumbent firms will see a 
mounting advantage because of their ability to more effectively im-
plement a patenting strategy based on patent portfolios.30  Companies 
with small patent portfolios will find it difficult to compete against 
firms with large patent holdings.  This, however, does not mean that 
small innovators will disappear from the market; rather, we will wit-
ness increasing segmentation of the innovation market, with startups 
and small firms complementing, or filling “gaps” in, the portfolios of 
larger companies. 
As for the normative implications, the patent portfolio theory 
foretells a more complex, costly, and distributionally significant patent 
system.31  While the growth of patent portfolios suggests that the pat-
ent system will become an increasing source of technological disclo-
sure, and that firms will have potentially beneficial incentives to 
broaden their research efforts (so as to allow portfolio construction), 
the net effects are almost certainly negative from a social perspective.32  
Thus, we discuss a number of policy responses that address the chal-
lenges arising from a portfolio-driven patent environment.  We begin 
by proposing several mechanisms for shifting the costs (information 
and otherwise) of patents from the public to potential patent-holders 
in order to improve the available information about patented inven-
tions and increase the cost of obtaining “low-value” patents.33  For ex-
ample, we recommend a reinvigorated doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel to force patentees to disclose more information earlier.  
Adopting this measure would both improve the quality of information 
about patented inventions and raise the cost of obtaining low-quality 
patents.34
Furthermore, we examine the possibility of introducing a system 
of differential fees that would correlate the fee charged to patent ap-
plicants to the number of patents they hold.  This measure would 
make it more expensive for holders of large portfolios to obtain addi-
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See infra Part V. 
34 See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure of 
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 210-28 (2002) (developing a new theory of prosecution 
history estoppel that takes into account the way the rule generates ex ante incentives). 
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tional patents and thus likely reduce the motivation of firms to seek 
protection for relatively insignificant patents.  As for the legislature, 
we consider whether the relaxation of antitrust-related limitations on 
mass-licensing of patents will diminish the effects of portfolios by re-
ducing their transaction costs.35  We also revisit the patent-antitrust in-
terface and argue that the traditional focus on the anticompetitive ef-
fects of individual patents must be broadened to take account of the 
possible harmful effects of the portfolio as a whole.  An antitrust pol-
icy that is sensitive to portfolio effects will do a better job of curbing 
anticompetitive practices by dominant patent holders. 
At the end of the day, though, it is important to understand the 
inherent limits of legal intervention in this case.  While we propose 
that targeted legal intervention along these lines will combat egre-
gious cases of patent abuses, it will neither arrest the tendency of firms 
to patent, nor will it level the innovation playing field.  Legal interven-
tion cannot completely negate the private advantages offered by large 
portfolios.  As a consequence, market forces will continue to play a 
significant role in shaping the future of innovation.  Ultimately, the 
best way for small companies to compete and thrive in this environ-
ment will be to exploit technological niches that were ignored by large 
incumbent firms.36
The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts.  Part I pre-
sents the growing empirical evidence of the patent paradox—the dis-
sonance between traditional theories of patent value and the realities 
of patent behavior—and critically analyzes the extant scholarly efforts 
to reconcile the gap between theory and reality. 
Part II sets forth the patent portfolio theory, beginning with an in-
troduction to the conceptual framework, and then moving to a de-
tailed discussion of the dual benefits of patent portfolios—scale and 
diversity—and their widespread commercial recognition.  It also ana-
lyzes the strategic considerations that firms face in portfolio construc-
tion, especially the inherent tension between scale and diversity, and 
notes why in most cases a high-volume, low-quality approach to patent 
acquisition will be the dominant choice. 
Part III offers real-world case studies of patent portfolios in the 
modern innovation environment, demonstrating the fit between our 
theory and commercial reality.  Our cases studies show (1) large-firm 
35 See infra Part V. 
36 See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA:  WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997) (showing how new technologies 
erupt in the low end of the market and eventually displace reigning technologies). 
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strategic portfolio construction (IBM), (2) complete domination of a 
technology by a firm dedicated to patent portfolio construction 
(Qualcomm), and (3) a small-firm strategy of both in-house and ac-
quisition-based portfolio development (Gemstar). 
Part IV discusses the explanatory, predictive, and normative impli-
cations of the portfolio theory as well as the complementary relation-
ship between the patent portfolio theory and prior scholarly efforts. 
Part V extends the implications discussed in Part IV to develop a 
range of policy options that address the challenges to the patent sys-
tem posed by the rise of patent portfolios.  While not all of these op-
tions will be either easily implemented or politically  feasible, we be-
lieve that the theory outlined in this article—at the least—requires a 
broadening of the conversation. 
I.  THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PATENT PARADOX 
In this part, we set out to accomplish two tasks.  First, we introduce 
the patent paradox.  Second, we present and critically evaluate the 
major theories that have been proffered in the literature to address 
the patent paradox.  We find that each of these approaches, while of-
fering some potential insight, falls short of a complete explanation of 
the true value of patents in the modern innovation environment. 
A.  The Patent Paradox:  A Primer 
The standard justification for the existence of patent protection is 
that patents are necessary to solve an appropriability problem that 
would otherwise plague the production of innovative products and 
processes.37  The appropriability problem stems from the “public 
good” characteristics of intellectual goods.38  Unlike tangible goods, 
37 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (discussing the “appropriability problem” that arises when firms 
cannot recoup R&D expenses). 
38 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610-11 (1982) 
(arguing that intellectual property law attempts to prevent free riders from using pub-
lic goods); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (highlighting that “a distinguishing character-
istic of intellectual property is its ‘public good’ aspect”); see also Richard P. Adelstein & 
Steven I. Perez, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas:  Copyright and Fair Use 
in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 209, 218 (1985) (comparing public 
goods to intellectual goods).  For a view that intellectual works do not share the distin-
guishing attributes of public goods, see Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property:  A Non-
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public goods share two distinctive characteristics:  non-rivalry of con-
sumption and non-excludability of benefits.39  A good is non-rival in 
consumption “when a unit of [that] good can be consumed by one 
individual without detracting, in the slightest, the consumption op-
portunities still available to others from that same unit.”40  A good dis-
plays non-excludable benefits when individuals who have not paid for 
the production of that good cannot be prevented (at a reasonable 
cost)41 from availing themselves of its benefits.42  The non-
excludability property of public goods gives rise to two related prob-
lems.  First, public goods are likely to be underproduced if left to the 
private market.  Second, markets for public goods will not form. 
Since inventions are essentially information goods, they too are 
susceptible to the twin problems of under-production and lack of 
market exchange.43  Absent patent protection, copiers would be able 
to appropriate much of the value embodied in inventions without in-
Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 273-87 (1989) (criticiz-
ing the application of a Posnerian theory of property rights to intellectual property). 
39 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46-47 (4th ed. 
2004) (explaining the two distinctive characteristics of public goods); RICHARD 
CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB 
GOODS 6-7 (1986) (providing concrete examples of non-rivalry and indivisibility); 
EDWIN MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 400-04 (6th ed. 1989) (discussing 
the political nature of public goods and noting that national defense is an example of 
one). 
40 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 39, at 6 (emphases omitted). 
41 It should be noted that the impossibility of exclusion is rarely absolute.  For ex-
ample, when examining exclusion by contract, very few goods, if any, display non-
excludable benefits in the strict sense of the term.  Thus, it is more accurate to de-
scribe goods as displaying non-excludable benefits when it is prohibitively expensive to 
bar non-payers from enjoying the good.  See Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism 
and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 632 (1993) (broadly defining non-
exclusivity to include “goods which can only be used exclusively at great expense”). 
42 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 39, at 6 (listing examples of non-excludable 
goods to demonstrate that they are available to everyone regardless of who paid for 
them). 
43 See generally, Dam, supra note 37 (analyzing the secondary economic problems 
created by the patent system); John S. McGee, Patent Exploitation:  Some Economic and 
Legal Problems, 9 J. L. & ECON. 135 (1966) (discussing the extent to which the property 
rights bestowed by patents are limited by the monopoly power that accompanies 
them); Dan Usher, The Welfare Economics of Invention, 31 ECONOMICA 279 (1964) (dem-
onstrating how the patent system causes the behavior of a competitive system to deviate 
from a Pareto optimum); Richard R. Nelson, The Economics of Invention:  A Survey of the 
Literature, 32 J. BUS. 101 (1959) (reviewing the literature on the economics of inven-
tion); STAFF OF THE S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE 
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (analyzing unresolved eco-
nomic inconsistencies in the patent system). 
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curring the considerable costs of research and development.44  In 
such a world, however, inventors would likely put their creative skills 
to rest and too few inventions would be produced.  Patents remedy 
the appropriability problem that attends the production of informa-
tion goods by bestowing upon inventors exclusive rights in the inven-
tions they divined.45
The appropriability story has undeniable elegance and common-
sense appeal, but it appears to suffer from one major problem:  it does 
not seem to be borne out by reality.  For the appropriability story to 
hold, patents must be shown to be an effective means of capturing 
value.  In other words, patent protection must be valuable for inven-
tors.  Yet extant empirical research consistently demonstrates that in-
dustry participants do not consider patents an effective appropriation 
mechanism; on the contrary, they deem patents inferior to other 
methods, such as lead time, learning curve advantages, and even se-
crecy.46  More importantly, other empirical studies suggest that the av-
erage value of an issued patent is actually quite small.  The vast major-
ity of U.S. patents pass their lives in complete idleness, gathering dust 
rather than revenues.47  According to Mark Lemley, “the total number 
of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-
license) is on the order of five percent of issued patents.”48  Worse yet, 
data about renewal rates reveal that nearly half of U.S. patents do not 
even reach the ten-year mark, and two-thirds lapse before the full 
twenty-year statutory protection term, as inventors prefer to abandon 
their patents and forego the payment of a modest renewal fee.49  The 
44 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons:  Imperfect Patent 
Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 991 (2000) 
(“The incentive theory correctly states that patent protection stimulates private invest-
ment by warding off low-cost imitators and promising monopolistic profits that will at 
least cover product development costs.”). 
45 Or, as Judge Richard Posner succinctly explained the rationale underlying the 
patent system, “the manufacturer . . . will not sow if he won’t be able to reap.”  
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3, at 43 (5th ed. 1998). 
46 See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 3 (finding that secrecy is heavily employed to 
protect product innovations); Levin et al., supra note 1, at 793-802 (illustrating the 
various methods of protecting competitive advantages). 
47 See Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, 
PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981) (discussing the 
advantages and legality of the accumulation of patents). 
48 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1507 (emphasis added). 
49 See Francesca Cornelli & Mark A. Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incen-
tives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197 (1999) (arguing that a menu of patent lives and fees 
is a more optimal mechanism than a uniform patent system).  Data from other coun-
tries is consistent with these findings.  For example, in a study that covered over a mil-
lion French patents applied for between 1951 and 1979 and about half a million Ger-
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patent renewal data thus suggest that many patents have no commer-
cial value at all. 
 
Table 1:  Percentage of Patents Renewed at Each Stage50
 
 1994* 1995** 1996* 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
First Stage 
(3.5 years) 
76% 80% 79% 80.3% 81.8% 83.1% 84.3% 84.5% 85.1% 86.8% 
Second Stage 
(7.5 years) 
54% 57% 55% 55.8% 56.6% 57.9% 59.4% 59.9% 59.5% 61.1% 
Third Stage 
(11.5 years) 
34% 25% 32% 35.4% 36.1% 37.7% 38.8% 39.1% 38.4% 42.9% 
 
Nevertheless, the renewal data cannot be used to calculate the av-
erage value of patents.51  To arrive at an accurate estimation of this fig-
ure, it is necessary to know the cost of patent protection, as well as the 
average expected value of patents.  Data about the costs associated 
with patent protection are readily available.  The cost of filing a patent 
application with the PTO, including attorney, filing, issue and renewal 
fees, is between $10,000 and $30,000.52  For inventions requiring in-
 
man patents issued between 1952 and 1972, Ariel Pakes found that only 7% of the 
French patents and 11% of the German patents were kept until their expiration date.  
Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options:  Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent 
Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 774 fig.4 (1986).  Similarly, Jean Olson Lanjouw, who 
studied a sample of over 2000 German patents filed between 1953 and 1988, reported 
that fewer than 50% of the patents were maintained for more than ten years, and fewer 
than 35% reached the statutory expiration date.  Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection 
in the Shadow of Infringement:  Simulation Estimations of Patent Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 
671, 693 (1998). 
50 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTS, supra note 4. 
  * Figures from 1994 and 1996 appear to have been rounded to the nearest 
whole percentage point before inclusion in their respective reports. 
  **  The Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal 1995 reported esti-
mated figures for renewal data, and that actual third stage renewals were higher than 
expected. 
 Maintenance fees (required for renewal) are currently $830 at 3.5 years (First 
Stage), $1,900 at 7.5 years (Second Stage), and $2,910 at 11.5 years.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b) 
(2000). 
51 The reason is quite straightforward:  if the return on successful or valuable pat-
ents is very high, then the average expected value of a patent may also be high despite 
the relatively low success rate. 
52 See, e.g., Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 473, 
476-77 (1996) (estimating the cost of prosecuting a typical patent application at 
$14,370); Jon D. Grossman & Eric Oliver, A Step-by-Step Guide to Prosecuting Business 
Method Patents, COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 2000, at 6, 9 (“[T]he median cost of preparing 
and prosecuting a utility patent application approaches $15,000 in legal fees alone.” 
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ternational protection, these amounts should be revised upwards by 
several orders of magnitude.53  While the cost of patent prosecution is 
not inconsequential for many inventors, it is dwarfed by the cost of 
patent litigation.  According to a survey conducted by the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, the median cost of patent litiga-
tion is $799,000 for each party through the end of discovery, and 
$1,503,000 each through the end of trial and appeal.54
What about the expected value of patents?  Despite the popular 
tendency to equate patents with supra-competitive monopolistic rents 
and the occasional media reports of decisions awarding astronomical 
damages to patentees in infringement cases,55 the actual value of a 
patent is likely to be rather low.  The empirical data about the value of 
patents is clearly at odds with the popular belief that patents are mod-
ern day gold mines.  In a 1986 study of over 1 million European pat-
ents, Ariel Pakes concluded that the typical value of patents is usually 
low.  He found that on average 50% of patents in France, Germany, 
and the U.K. are worth less than $2189, and that 90% of the patents 
have a value of less than $25,000.56  A 1998 study by Mark Schanker-
man echoes Pakes’ findings.57  Using renewal data, Schankerman es-
timated the mean patent value at $4313 for pharmaceutical patents, 
(citing the 1997 American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Economic 
Survey of Patent Lawyers) (assessing the typical charges for intellectual property appli-
cations based on location)); Wayne M. Kennard, Obtaining and Litigating Software Pat-
ents, 430 PLI/PAT 193, 208 (1996) (suggesting that the cost of drafting a software pat-
ent application is between $10,000 and $30,000 and that the cost of prosecuting it is 
another $10,000 to $20,000).  As Mark Lemley correctly notes, these estimates fail to 
account for “either appeals or interferences, which obviously raise the cost a great 
deal.”  Lemley, supra note 3, at 1498 n.13. 
53 For example, Berrier estimates that the cost of obtaining protection in ten 
European countries is typically over $95,000.  Berrier, supra note 52, at 479. 
54 AIPLA REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY (OF U.S. IP PRACTITIONERS) (1999), cited 
in Craig P. Opperman, Computer Technology Patents (with an Emphasis on Internet & E-
Commerce Related Patents), 590 PLI/PAT 1039, 1047 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Judge Orders EBay To Pay $29.5 Million, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 7, 2003, at B2 (reporting verdict against EBay for infringing the patents of a Vir-
ginia company); John F. Manser, Small Electronics Company Zaps Motorola: Power Integra-
tions Wins $32.3 Million Award in Patent Case, DEL. L. WKLY., Oct. 26, 1999, at 1 (report-
ing a $32 million dollar verdict, which the patent holder threatened to triple to almost 
$100 million because the infringment was allegedly willful). 
56 Pakes, supra note 49, at 777. 
57 Schankerman, supra note 1, at 94.  All amounts are in 1980 U.S. dollars.  It is 
noteworthy that the median values are much lower. 
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$4969 for chemical patents, $15,120 for mechanical patents, and 
$19,837 for electronics patents.58
 
Table 2:  Estimates of Patent Value59
 
Quantile 
Pharma- 
ceuticals 
Chemicals Mechanical Electronics* 
All-
technology 
0.25  515   447   638   627   557  
0.5 
(median value) 
 1631   1594   2930   3159   2329  
0.75  5427   5807   13,769   16,322   10,331  
0.90  11,787   13,735   40,840   53,122   29,871  
0.95  19,920   24,363   83,857   113,403   60,386  
0.99  52,139   69,906   321,966   481,429   231,360  
Mean  4313   4969   15,120   19,837   11,060  
All amounts are in 1980 U.S. dollars. * Excludes Japan. 
 
Notwithstanding the high private cost of patent protection and 
the relatively low expected value of individual patents, the number of 
filings in the U.S. (and worldwide) continues to increase.60  Perhaps 
even more surprising is the fact that many of those responsible for the 
increase in the number of filings are large corporations that are sup-
posed to be patent pundits.61  Finally, it is apparent that corporations, 
such as IBM, pride themselves on the number of patents they have 
been able to secure and emphasize the attainment of new patents in 
press releases and correspondence to shareholders.62
 
 
58 Id.  Both economists pointed out that the distribution of patent values is highly 
skewed on account of a small number of highly valuable patents.  Pakes, supra note 49, 
at 779; Schankerman, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
59 Values are taken from Schankerman, supra note 1, at 95 tbl.5. 
60 USPTO Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 
50, at 107. 
61 For data showing the increasing percentage of patents obtained by private cor-
porations, see PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, SPECIAL REPORT:  ALL PATENTS, ALL TYPES, JANUARY 1977 – 
DECEMBER 2004 A1-1 (2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ 
oeip/taf/apat.pdf. 
62 See, e.g., Press Release, IBM, IBM Breaks U.S. Patent Record:  Tops List for Elev-
enth Consecutive Year—More Than 25,000 IBM Innovations Patented Since 1993 (Jan. 
12, 2004), http://www.ibm.com/industries/education/doc/content/news/pressrelease/ 
992547110.html (discussing IBM patent record); see also infra Part III.B (IBM case study). 
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Figure 1:  The Recent Rise in Patent Filings63
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Figure 2:  The Rise in Patent Intensity64
 
It is abundantly clear that firms act as though patents are impor-
tant.  But why?  Filing patterns and firms’ attitudes toward patents 
have presented theorists with a puzzle:  if patents are valuable, where 
does their value lie?  And if they are not valuable, as the empirical re-
search suggests, why do they matter so much to both corporations and 
63 USPTO Performance Accountability Report:  Fiscal Year 2003, supra note 50, at 
107. 
64 A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 30 fig.2-2. 
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investors?  Following convention, we refer to this puzzle as the patent 
paradox. 
It may be tempting to treat the patent paradox as yet another ex-
ample of bounded rationality, perhaps even the primary one.  On this 
theory, patenting patterns represent irrational behavior on the part of 
corporate managers and investors, presumably stemming from their 
systematic failure to grasp the limited value of individual patents.65  
Despite the surface appeal of this theory, we cannot subscribe to it.  
Given that virtually all the corporations that engage in intensive pat-
enting operate in highly competitive industries, and that many of 
them are Fortune 500 companies, it is highly unlikely that such irra-
tional behavior could persist for so many years without grave eco-
nomic consequences.  Surely, if the cost of patenting outweighed the 
benefit, companies that heavily rely on patent protection would put 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage and gradually lose their 
market share to rivals that abstain from patenting.  Yet, this is not 
borne out by reality.  Furthermore, all firms seem to actively seek pat-
ent protection.  Hence, we reject the hypothesis that the patent para-
dox is born of illogical decision making.  We are not alone.  As we 
show next, none of the academic theorists who have addressed the 
patent paradox have considered bounded rationality to be an ade-
quate explanation. 
B.  The Scholarly Response to Date:   
Existing Explanations and Their Shortcomings 
Not surprisingly, the patent paradox has not escaped the attention 
of legal scholars and economists.  While most scholars have found it 
sufficient to merely note the puzzle (almost in passing), a few theorists 
have taken the road less traveled and ventured to produce theoretical 
responses that seek to explain the patent paradox.  In the remainder 
of this subsection, we review these responses and critically evaluate 
them.  Although we conclude that none of these models does an ade-
quate job of explaining away the patent paradox, we would like to 
emphasize at the outset that our goal is not to discard these theories.  
On the contrary, we believe that each of the works we review made a 
valuable contribution to the patent literature and that each correctly 
captures certain aspects, although not the totality, of the modern pat-
ent system.  Furthermore, in Part IV.B, we show how some of the in-
sights made in prior contributions can be reconceptualized through 
the prism of our patent portfolio theory. 
65 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12 (arguing that bounded rationality affects pur-
chasing decisions); Tor, supra note 12 (discussing bounded rationality in the context of 
market-entry decision making). 
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1.  Patent Signals 
In an excellent recent article, Clarisa Long suggests that the value 
of patents inheres not so much in the exclusivity they confer upon in-
ventors, but rather in their ability to serve as credible signals.  Chal-
lenging the traditional view that exclusivity, and the rents associated 
with it, are “the alpha and omega of the private value of patent 
rights,”66 Long argues that firms use patents to “credibly convey in-
formation about the invention to observers who otherwise might not 
be willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.”67  
Stated more generally, patents are valuable because they “reduc[e] in-
formational asymmetries between patentees and [third parties].”68
But what information do patents convey?  Long maintains that 
patents provide two types of information:  (1) information about the 
patented invention and (2) information about the patenting firm.69  
As for the first kind, Long points out that patents are publicly avail-
able documents that contain abundant information about an inven-
tion.  And since the law imposes severe penalties on intentional mis-
representation of material information in a patent application, 
observers know that “the information contained in a patent has some 
credibility.”70  The second type of information signaled by patents is 
admittedly somewhat more oblique.  Relying on previous academic 
research, Long explains that patent counts are likely to be positively 
correlated with other “less readily measurable firm attributes such as 
knowledge capital,” and hence may serve as a proxy for these other 
attributes.71  Under this theory, the cost of acquiring patent protection 
ensures the effectiveness of a patent as a signaling device.  Since pat-
ents are costly to obtain, low-quality firms would find it difficult to imi-
tate the signals of high-quality firms.72
We begin our critique with the first type of signal mentioned by 
Long—information about the patented invention.  The main problem 
with this signal is that it does not get around the patent paradox.  Per 
66 Long, supra note 1, at 627.  It should be noted, in fairness, that later in the arti-
cle, Long clarifies that she does not dispute that the exclusivity associated with patent 
rights is important.  Id. at 637. 
67 Id. at 636. 
68 Id. at 627. 
69 See id. at 647 (“Patents and portfolios can convey information about the inven-
tion and the firm.”). 
70 Id. at 650. 
71 Id. at 627, 651-52. 
72 See id. at 657 (“Obtaining patents may be an effective signal that is hard for bor-
ing firms to mimic because the cost of obtaining patents deters boring firms from at-
tempting to signal in this manner.”). 
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our prior discussion,73 the expected average value of individual inven-
tions is very low, a premise that Long herself accepts.74  Given this fact, 
it is not clear how information about individual inventions is valuable 
to third parties.  Or, put more generally, why should the market care 
about information regarding a virtually valueless commodity?  Indeed, 
it could even be argued that, given the low expected value of the aver-
age individual invention, third parties might be well-advised to ignore 
patents.  Long’s theory would be more compelling if she were able to 
show that third parties have an effective way of distinguishing the few 
high-value inventions from the rest of the pack.  However, she does 
not make any such suggestion, and indeed, there seems to be no a 
priori reason to assume that third parties have an informational edge 
over patenting firms that would enable them to better estimate the 
value of patents.  In fact, the opposite is likely to be true:  patentees 
are very familiar with the unique characteristics of the markets in 
which they operate and hence are in a better position to assess the 
commercial success of their inventions. 
Furthermore, patent applications convey little information about 
the potential commercial value of the invention.  For example, pat-
entees do a notoriously poor job of referencing prior inventions in 
their patent applications.75  Without information about competing 
technologies and blocking patents, third parties cannot possibly de-
termine the value of the patented invention.  Finally, the potential 
signaling value of the patent application is further weakened by the 
lax and “patent-friendly” review given by the PTO (which approves 
nearly all of the applications that it receives).76  Moreover, after pass-
ing this diminished level of scrutiny, a significant percentage of issued 
patents are declared invalid when challenged in court; hence, third 
parties cannot rely too heavily on the validity of issued patents that 
have not been exposed to litigation.  Indeed, even Long acknowledges 
73 See supra Part I.A. 
74 See Long, supra note 1, at 626 (“[W]hen the value of intellectual property rights 
in framed purely in terms of exclusivity and rents, worthless patents abound.”). 
75 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:  Prop-
erty Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-
90 (1999) (discussing the poor quality of patent applications in terms of the number 
and nature of prior art references). 
76 See, e.g., Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications 
and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3 (2001) (in-
dicating that once continuing applications are included, the patent approval rate is 
95%).  Quillen and Webster conclude that the PTO might ultimately approve as many 
as 97% of all patent applications.  Id. at 13. 
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that in many circumstances patent signals may be ambiguous, in which 
case their value becomes suspect.77
As for the second signal, that of patent counts, it seems at first 
glance that Long treats the signaling value of patent counts as no 
more than the sum of the signaling values of individual patents in the 
portfolio.78  For the reasons discussed above,79 this theory cannot carry 
the day.  If the signaling value of each individual patent is virtually nil, 
aggregating the value of the individual signals still leaves one with very 
little, if anything at all.  However, in later discussion, Long seems to 
touch on the possibility that patent counts may be capable of signaling 
more than individual patents.  Specifically, she suggests that an over-
view of all the patents a firm has “can convey information about the 
lines of research a firm is conducting and how quickly the research is 
proceeding,” as well as signal other firm characteristics.80  Here, Long 
is clearly on to something.  Patent counts do signal information about 
the firm.  However, as we discuss in Part II, the lion’s share of the 
value of patent counts, or portfolios, lies not in their signaling func-
tion, but rather in the rents they generate for their holders.  The sig-
naling value of patent counts is simply a minor component of the 
framework we devise.81  Furthermore, we are also able to demonstrate 
that the most important information signaled by patent portfolios is 
not so much about research lines but rather about the ability of the 
holder to understand the modern patent system and to take advan-
tage of it.82  Therefore, our theory plays up the very aspects that Long 
attempts to play down. 
2.  Patents as Internal Metrics 
Recognizing that patents are a relatively ineffective means for cap-
turing value, economist Richard Levin, alone and together with oth-
ers, has suggested that patents may serve important intra-firm pur-
poses; specifically, he proposes that patents might be used to measure 
77 See Long, supra note 1, at 659 (“[P]atents and portfolios may be ambiguous 
signals that create a pooling equilibrium.”). 
78 See id. at 643-44 (“I first present a testable hypothesis that patents (and by exten-
sion, patent portfolios) could reduce information asymmetries by directly conveying 
information about the invention and the firm at low cost and by serving as a signal of 
firm attributes that are deemed positive by observers.”). 
79 See supra Part II.A. 
80 Long, supra note 1, at 646. 
81 See Ariel Pakes & Margaret Simpson, Patent Renewal Data, 1989 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:  MICROECONOMICS 331, 365 (noting that “patent counts 
are a very noisy measure of the value of patented output”). 
82 See infra Part IV.B. 
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employee productivity.83  Agency theory suggests that employees, as 
agents, have an inherent incentive to shirk their duties if left to their 
own devices.84  Accordingly, one of the challenges facing employers is 
to accurately gauge the performance of their employees.  In the con-
text of research and development, it is virtually impossible to directly 
measure employee effort, and the only quantifiable parameter is re-
sults.  A natural way to approximate successful results is to look at pat-
ent filings. Therefore, patents are valuable insofar as they serve as a 
metric for evaluating employee productivity. 
On its face, the internal metric theory has some obvious appeal.  
After all, measuring employee productivity is a tricky task, and the 
PTO is an impartial evaluator whose decisions are not tainted by favor-
itism toward certain employees.  Upon closer inspection, however, the 
internal metric theory unravels.  Indeed, it falls prey to the patent 
paradox that it set out to explain.  Given the low private value of indi-
vidual patents, it seems problematic to equate patent filings with suc-
cessful job performance.  Moreover, when the costs of obtaining pro-
tection are added to the calculus, one may even wonder why 
employees who produce a higher number of patents deserve to be re-
warded.  In light of the patent paradox, it could even be argued that 
R&D employees who engage in massive patenting are wasting valuable 
resources and should channel their energy and productivity to other 
ends.  Another problem with the internal metric theory is the fact that 
more than half of the patent applications filed list more than one in-
ventor.85  In cases of co-inventorship, the joint inventors are not re-
quired to make equal contributions to the invention, nor is each re-
quired to collaborate on the subject matter of every individual claim.86  
83 Levin, supra note 9, at 200-01.  It should be noted that both works suggest other 
possible motivations for patenting such as improving one’s position in bargaining and 
litigation.  We discuss these motivations separately in Part I.B.4. 
84 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 777, 780 (1972) (discussing the incentive 
to shirk when the performance of individual team members cannot be easily moni-
tored); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) (“The separation of ownership from control produces 
a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, 
diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of 
power disappear.”).
85 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United 
States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 96-97 (2002) (“[In the authors’ random sample 
of 1000 utility patents issued between 1996 and 1998,] each patent listed 2.26 inventors 
on average, and the median patent listed two inventors.”). 
86 See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000) (“Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even 
though . . . each did not make the same type or amount of contribution . . . .”); see also 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The 
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Rather, the standard is merely that each inventor must “generally con-
tribute to the conception of the invention.”87  As a result, employers 
cannot reliably use patents to determine the precise participation of 
their R&D employees in the development of various patented inven-
tions.  Finally, patents are an unwieldy measure of productivity be-
cause the PTO ultimately approves almost all of the applications it re-
ceives,88 creating a situation in which patent counts are easily 
manipulated.  This would allow R&D employees so inclined (and 
agency theory suggests that most would be)89 to over represent their 
productivity by simply increasing the number of applications they 
produce.90
3.  The Lottery Theory of Patents 
The lottery theory of patents, propounded by the economist F.M. 
Scherer, maintains that patents are essentially lottery tickets: while 
most have only a negligible value, a few are of such great financial 
consequence that they provide a sufficient incentive to inventors to 
obtain patents, based on the infinitesimal hope of receiving an ex-
tremely high payoff.91  This theory follows from a more general con-
jecture made by Schumpeter that, although investors are generally 
risk-averse, they will often overrate their chances of success when pre-
sented with a sufficiently great potential reward.  Thus, offering “spec-
tacular prizes” to “a small minority of winners” is a more effective way 
to promote innovation, effort, and investment than a more equal dis-
tribution of benefits.92
statute does not set forth the minimum quality or quantity of contribution required for 
joint inventorship.”). 
87 Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
88 See Quillen & Webster, supra note 76, at 3 (“[T]he number of original UPR ap-
plications allowed in fiscal years 1995-1998 was 95% of the number of original UPR 
applications filed in fiscal years 1993-1996.”). 
89 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
90 We thank Ed Rubin for this point. 
91 Scherer, supra note 1, at 3.  At least one court, in seeking to divide marital as-
sets, has embraced the metaphor.  See McDougal v. McDougal, 545 N.W.2d 357, 358 
(Mich. 1996) (analogizing patents to “lottery tickets in the days before a drawing”).
92 Scherer, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 73-74 (1942)).  Scherer refers to the theory as the “skew-
ness hypothesis.”  Professor Scherer finds empirical support for the proposition that 
the patent system functions as something of a lottery.  Through several different em-
pirical analyses, Professor Scherer finds that the distribution of value among individual 
patents (frequency versus economic value to their holders) follows a skewed distribu-
tion rather than a normal distribution, in which most of the total value of all patents 
comes from a few extraordinarily valuable patents, rather than an aggregation of pat-
ents with middling value.  Id. at 7-12.  His study of a sample of 776 German and 222 
U.S. patents showed that, for both groups, the most valuable 10% of the patents ac-
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The lottery theory has obvious limitations; while the lottery meta-
phor is illuminating, one should be wary not to stretch it too far.  First, 
although the inventive process involves a significant degree of uncer-
tainty and some degree of luck, it is far from being a true lottery.  
Unlike lotteries, which are completely random, the inventive process 
is knowledge based:  ex ante information (such as technological know-
how and industrial expertise) plays a key role, and to a large extent 
determines a company’s likelihood of success. 
Second, the lottery theory critically depends on the assumption 
that inventors, like lottery ticket buyers, are risk-seeking—indeed, so 
risk-seeking that they are willing to engage in an activity with a nega-
tive expected value.  However, the standard assumption in the patent 
literature, as Scherer himself recognizes, is that investors are actually 
risk-averse.93  To overcome this potentially fatal problem, Scherer rea-
sons that after a certain point, at which the odds of success are infini-
tesimal and the potential reward sufficiently large, potential investors’ 
enthusiasm increases with the absolute value of the possible reward 
without regard for the actual odds of success.94  Alas, Scherer does not 
provide any direct empirical support for this argument. 
Third, the lottery theory assumes that all inventors compete for 
the same prize.  Yet in reality, this is not the case.  Investment in R&D 
often results in a flurry of non-overlapping patented inventions.  Fur-
thermore, even corporations that have not captured any lucrative pat-
ents may nevertheless benefit from previous research as it puts them 
in a better position to compete for other inventions. 
Fourth, the lottery analogy does not explain modern filing trends.  
By the time a company files for a patent, it can fairly accurately esti-
mate the value of that patent.  At the conclusion of the R&D stage, a 
company can reasonably predict whether it has the next Prozac on its 
hands, or simply another low-value patent.  Consequently, one would 
expect firms that have not arrived at lucrative inventions to cut back 
on their losses by forgoing the cost of obtaining patent protection.  
Yet even such firms by and large prefer to go ahead and patent.  The 
lottery theory offers a contentious explanation for why companies en-
gage in R&D in the first place.  However, it does not even begin to ex-
counted for over 80% of the total value of the entire sample.  Id. at 8.  Finding similar 
results in other types of investments in high technology, Scherer shows that the value 
of investments in high technology generally is driven more by the “spectacular win-
ners” at the statistical fringes, rather than an aggregation of investments of middling 
value.  Id. at 18. 
93 Id. at 15.  But see Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-
Definition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 808 (1998) (asserting that “inventors 
are likely among the least risk-averse people on the planet”). 
94 See Scherer, supra note 1, at 18 (suggesting that investors can be “simultaneously 
variance-averse and skewness-loving”). 
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plain various other salient features of the modern patents system.  In-
deed, in Part IV.B, we show that the lottery theory misses some of the 
key effects of patents and thus can lead to a distorted view of the pat-
ent world.  For example, the lottery theory suggests that “losing ticket” 
patents (which constitute the vast majority of patents issued) would 
simply fall by the wayside.  Firms should have no use for such patents, 
and hence they should play no role in incentivizing firms to engage in 
R&D.  Yet as we demonstrate in Part II, and as leading technology 
firms have already come to recognize, even these “losing ticket” pat-
ents yield significant value. 
4.  Defensive Patenting 
The defensive patenting theory is, in a way, the flipside of the lot-
tery theory.  While the lottery theory views patents as high-risk invest-
ments, the defensive patenting theory views them as a type of insur-
ance.  Under this theory, the acquisition of patents is something of an 
arms race, whereby competing firms use patents as bargaining chips to 
negotiate with competitors and to secure certain niches in the mar-
ketplace.95  The defensive patenting theory is based on the assumption 
that the Federal Circuit has strengthened patent rights in such a way 
to make the threat of patent litigation significantly more potent, thus 
altering firms’ incentives to patent.96  Even though patents themselves 
have not become any more valuable, in the sense of appropriating re-
turns to research and development,97 they have somehow become 
more valuable as the subject matter of potential litigation.  Thus, the 
defensive patenting theory holds that firms acquire patents to ward off 
possible lawsuits by using the patents as bargaining chips with poten-
95 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 104, 125 (discussing the use of patents in 
the semiconductor industry and formulating a “strategic response” hypothesis about 
the utility of patents); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconduc-
tor Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 180  
(updating some of the data from the Hall & Ziedonis study and examining the en-
forcement behavior of U.S. semiconductor firms).  Hall and Ziedonis’s defensive 
theory of patents is based on research that used U.S. semiconductor firms as a case 
study. 
96 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 105-07 (linking the “surge in patenting” in 
the United States to the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit); Ziedonis, supra note 95, 
at 188-89 (same). 
97 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 102 (“R&D managers in semiconductors 
consistently report that patents are among the least effective mechanisms for appropri-
ating returns on R&D investments.”); Ziedonis, supra note 95, at 181 (citing survey evi-
dence suggesting that “firms in most industries have not increased their reliance on 
patents for appropriating returns to R&D over the decade of the 1980s”). 
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tial plaintiffs.98  Even the firms that threaten others with litigation of-
ten do so in the hope of securing a cross-licensing agreement with the 
potential defendant, so that the potential defendant will not later sue 
the potential plaintiff on another patent. 
The defensive patenting theory has considerable explanatory 
power.  It is grounded in empirical research and, in our opinion, ac-
curately captures certain elements of the patent world.  Nevertheless, 
it can be criticized on two grounds.  First, the defensive patenting the-
ory focuses on only the defensive uses of patents, while ignoring the 
important offensive uses conferred with patent rights.  Like Long’s 
theory of patent signals, defensive patenting does not consider patents 
as an effective means of appropriating returns.  Due to this narrow 
prism, defensive patenting ignores many of the affirmative ways by 
which patents generate returns to inventors.  Second, the defensive 
patenting theory does not discuss how the defensive effects of patents 
vary along different patent portfolios.  This is a key omission.  As we 
show in Part II, the defensive force of patents critically depends not 
simply on the number of patents, but also on the design of the pat-
entee’s portfolio. 
II.  A THEORY OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
Having argued that the prior theories addressing the patent para-
dox are incomplete, we turn in this Part to the development of an al-
ternative view—one that offers richer opportunities for understanding 
the meaning and implications of the patent paradox.  The fundamen-
tal argument here is that the real value of patents lies not in their in-
dividual significance, but instead in their aggregation into a patent 
portfolio:  a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual pat-
ents that, when combined, confer an array of important advantages 
upon the portfolio holder.99  We find that the benefits of patent port-
98 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 109-10 (attributing aggressive patenting 
trends to companies’ desire to deter litigation); Ziedonis, supra note 95, at 208 (noting 
an increasing trend in “directing a larger share of their innovation-related resources 
toward defending, enforcing, and challenging patents in court”). 
99 The value of patent portfolios has been widely recognized in commercial cir-
cles, but has received little attention (and virtually no discussion of its implications out-
side of antitrust) in the legal-academic literature. 
 For examples of recognition of the commercial value of patent portfolios, see Gary 
M. Hoffmann, Turning Your Intellectual Property Assets into Cash, in HANDLING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2003, 740 PLI/PAT 1005, 
1019-20 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2003) (noting the additional value conferred by 
covering various potential variations of the invention in a “multitude of patents” rather 
than in a single patent); Carolina Braunschweig, Nano Nonsense, VENTURE CAP. J., Jan. 
1, 2003, at 18, 24 (noting the business goal of some young companies in the nanotech-
nology industries to build patent portfolios); Cathryn Campbell, Patenting the Tools of 
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folios are substantial enough to encourage patenting behavior irre-
spective of the expected value of the underlying individual patents 
themselves; the marginal expected gain in value of adding an addi-
tional patent to a well-crafted patent portfolio will almost invariably 
exceed the marginal cost of acquisition.100  We argue that this theory 
Biotechnology, VENTURE CAP. J., May 1, 2003, at 33, 34 (asserting that “numerous exam-
ples are available which demonstrate that strategically planned and well-managed pat-
ent portfolios can be financially profitable,” and citing the successful biotechnology 
portfolio of the Dyax Corporation as one such example); John Cox, As Patent Suits Pro-
liferate, So Do Worries, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 18, 2003, at 8, available at 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2003/0818patents.html (linking an apparent 
rise in patent suits in computer technology to increasing development of patent port-
folios); Michael Kenward, Displaying a Winning Glow, TECHNOLOGY REV., Jan./Feb. 
1999, at 68, available at http://www.techreview.com/articles/99/01/kenward0199.asp 
(describing Cambridge Display Technology, a startup company that is using its patent 
portfolio to build alliances and carve out a commercial position in the LED industry); 
David Kline, The New Gold Rush in Patents, UPSIDE, May 1998, at 58, 58 (“In the four 
years since IBM Corp. began a concerted campaign to make better use of its patent 
portfolio . . . the company has increased its annual patent license revenues from about 
$350 million in 1993 to more than $1 billion today.”); Michael Mattis, Aurigin Systems 
Sees Gold in Intellectual Property, UPSIDE, Aug. 1998, at 112, 114 (describing the com-
pany’s efforts to build a software-based system to assist in managing and planning pat-
ent portfolio development and asserting that “most high-tech companies have only de-
veloped real patent portfolios during the past couple of years”); Eric Nee, Qualcomm 
Hits the Big Time, FORTUNE, May 15, 2000, at 213, 220 (describing how Qualcomm, by 
virtue of amassing a patent portfolio related to CDMA wireless technology, can require 
“any company that makes CDMA products, be they chips, phones, or infrastructure 
gear” to get a license); Tim O’Reilly, The Internet Patent Land Grab, COMMUNICATIONS 
OF THE ACM, June 2000, at 29-30 (“[T]he [patent] system is tilted heavily in favor of 
companies with large patent portfolios.  As one lawyer from a company with a huge 
patent portfolio commented to me about Amazon.com: ‘It’s not a big company.  It 
doesn’t have enough patents to play this game.’”); David Raymond, How to Find True 
Value in Companies, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 64, 64 (noting that a collection of stocks 
picked via the quality of a firm’s patent portfolio appreciated at three times the rate of 
the S&P 500 from 1989 to 1998). 
 For more academic treatments, see John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies 
with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 856 (2001) (citing exam-
ples—Motorola’s GSM patent portfolio and Gemstar’s interactive TV Guide portfo-
lio—where “firms have gained very strong [market] positions primarily on the basis of 
portfolios”); Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 108–10 (finding, in an interview study, 
that a major driver of the construction of patent portfolios in the semiconductor in-
dustry was for defensive and bargaining-leverage purposes); Steven C. Carlson, Note, 
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (1999) (noting concerns 
with the insulation that large patent portfolios provide to their individual component 
patents). 
 For details of the relative benefits of patent portfolios, see infra Part II.B. 
100 Note that under the portfolio theory, such patenting decisions are made with-
out direct reference to the net expected value of the individual patent. See infra Part 
II.C. 
 The average administrative costs of obtaining a U.S. patent are typically estimated 
to be in the range of $20,000.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 1498-99 (positing 
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provides the best explanation yet for modern patenting trends, which 
show a propensity for firms to patent even where the net expected 
value of obtaining the individual patent is likely to be zero (or even 
less).101  Under the patent portfolio theory, such decision making is 
rational because individual patents are required inputs for the con-
struction and maintenance of a patent portfolio.  That is, in the mod-
ern patenting environment, the prosecution of an individual patent is 
best understood as a means to the commercially desirable end of a 
patent portfolio, rather than the end itself. 
The theory of patent portfolios is outlined in three parts below.  
First, in Part II.A, we introduce the concept of a patent portfolio as a 
collection of distinct-but-related patents, providing a definitional basis 
for what follows.  In Part II.B, we explain why the advantages of patent 
portfolios far exceed the value of individual patents, observing that 
well-crafted patent portfolios have features of both scale (broad pro-
tection of subject matter) and diversity (diminished reliance on any 
single patent) that enable portfolio holders to simultaneously wield 
significant marketplace power while hedging against the risk and un-
certainty inherent in innovation-driven commercial activities.  Part 
II.C links the advantages of patent portfolios to “the patent paradox,” 
noting that because most of the advantages of patent portfolios are di-
rectly related to the quantity of constituent patents, and because high-
volume patenting addresses key strategic challenges in the develop-
ment of portfolios, firms can be expected to seek patents in quantities 
well beyond what would be supported by the net expected value of the 
individual patents themselves.  That is, subject to some limits, addi-
tional patent prosecution is almost always the dominant decision. 
A.  An Introduction to Patent Portfolios 
As used here, a patent portfolio is a collection of related patents, 
held under common control.  In the patent portfolio theory, related-
ness is an important feature:  unlike corporate stock portfolios, for ex-
ample, where broad diversification is a typical goal, patent portfolios 
are more narrowly focused within a technological field.  This distinc-
tion is based on the knowledge of the portfolio holder.  Whereas pat-
ent portfolios are paradigmatically held by knowledgeable industry or 
$20,000 as a “conservative average”); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of 
Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 138 n.3 (2000) (estimating an av-
erage of $25,000).  The recent National Science Foundation review of the patent sys-
tem found that relatively simple prosecution cases will cost at least $7,500, and that 
more complex prosecution efforts cost in the tens of thousands of dollars.  A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 68 (2004). 
101 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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technology players,102 broadly diversified stock portfolios are well 
suited to holders that lack detailed information about any individual 
industry or technology.  The additional focused expertise about the 
technology or industry allows patent portfolio holders to create far 
more narrowly focused collections of assets (here, patents). 
But not too narrow:  while patent portfolios consist of related pat-
ents, this is not to say that they are not diverse in any respect.  Indeed, 
it is the ability to leverage the differences among collected patents 
that makes patent portfolios a powerful tool in the modern, innova-
tion-driven marketplace.103  Thus, a patent portfolio is best under-
stood as a collection of individual patents that share critical techno-
logical features.  A portfolio might be focused on a specific problem 
in a particular industry, such as techniques for using 90-nanometer 
and smaller conductors in semiconductor manufacturing.104  Or it 
might be more process-based; for example, a bio-pharmaceutical pat-
ent portfolio might be targeted at the treatment of a specific disease 
in a specific way, such as the use of statins to address human choles-
terol levels.105  Or a portfolio might be more simply targeted at a spe-
cific individual product, such as a genetically modified agricultural 
product or a consumer electronics product.  Whether process-based, 
problem-based, or product-based, the unifying concept of patent port-
folios is their aggregation of related patentable inventions in a way 
that is coherently designed and directed.  To be sure, collections of 
far less related or even completely unrelated patents can and do ex-
ist—some might even call them “portfolios”—but these random as-
sortments are little more than that, and thus lack the power of a true 
patent portfolio. 
102 But see infra Part III.C (discussing Gemstar’s practice of acquiring patent-
holding companies in order to create its own portfolio). 
103 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the diversity-features of patent portfolios). 
104 See, e.g., John Markoff, Advanced Micro Narrows Gap in Race for New Chip, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2004, at C5 (reporting a new line of microprocessors being developed 
by competing technology companies). 
105 See, e.g., NBC Nightly News:  Profile:  Lifesaving Statins Too Expensive for Many 
Americans with Heart Problems to Afford (NBC television broadcast Feb. 25, 2004) (“The 
statin drugs, including Zocor, Lipitor, and Pravachol, make up one of the great success 
stories of medicine.  Study after study involving hundreds of thousands of people show 
the drugs dramatically reduce the risk of heart disease and stroke, even for people with 
cholesterol in the normal range.”); see also All-in-One Pills for Heart Disease, HARV. 
HEALTH LETTER, July 1, 2004, at 3, 3 (discussing the trend of American pharmaceutical 
companies bundling their brand-name products into new combinations, which skep-
tics see as a marketing maneuver to entice people into buying brand name drugs, but 
which also gives the patent holder fresh patent protection on a new pill made of older 
drugs with patents that will expire much sooner). 
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Finally, while the patent portfolio theory does not require a spe-
cific quantity of patents to form a portfolio,106 size does matter.  Virtu-
ally all of the benefits of a patent portfolio sketched below are broadly 
proportional to the quantity of individual component patents in-
volved.  As noted in some detail in Part II.B.1 below, it is the “heft” of 
a patent portfolio—as measured in large part by the quantity of the 
patents comprising it—that fundamentally determines its effectiveness 
as a tool in the marketplace.  Of course, the quantity of patents that 
comprise an effective portfolio is not limitless, and will, of course, de-
pend upon a number of situation-specific factors, such as the technol-
ogy involved, industry structure, the existence of competitive portfo-
lios, and others.  And there are likely to be diminishing returns from 
adding patents to a portfolio as its size increases beyond a certain 
point.  But as a general matter, more is better; the benefits of patent 
portfolios increase with their scale—thus demonstrating the explana-
tory power of the patent portfolio theory in the modern patenting en-
vironment. 
B.  Scale and Diversity:  The Advantages of Patent Portfolios 
The benefits, many and varied, of patent portfolios to their hold-
ers in the modern commercial environment are currently better rec-
ognized in the business world than in academia.107 As a general mat-
ter, these benefits can be divided into two broad categories:  those 
that relate to scale-features of portfolios, and those that relate to di-
versity-features.  The scale-features of portfolios spring from the ob-
servation that a well-conceived patent portfolio is in many ways a form 
of “super-patent,” sharing many of the marketplace advantages con-
ventionally attributed to individual patents (paradigmatically, rights to 
exclude others from the marketplace),108 only on a larger, broader 
106 Formally, any two or more related patents can qualify as a patent portfolio for 
our purposes. 
107 Throughout Part II.B, we demonstrate the commercial relevance of the patent 
portfolio theory by noting, via examples and citations, that many of the advantages that 
we identify have previously been recognized as important features of patent portfolios 
by major commercial players.  See, e.g., John P. Sumner & Steven W. Lundberg, Software 
Patents:  Are They Here to Stay?, COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1991, at 8, 9 (“Having a strong of-
fensive and defensive patent posture is usually enabled not by a single patent but by a 
patent portfolio . . . . Thus it can be important to consistently obtain patent protection 
to leverage research and development dollars into long-term assets which eventually 
can blossom into a fence of protection.”). 
108 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2000) (describing patent enforcement rights); Cont’l 
Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (holding that the power to 
exclude others is “the very essence of the right” conferred by patent law); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (“[P]atents are not given as favors . . . but are 
meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a 
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scale.  By aggregating the individualized value of a number of closely 
related patents, the scale-features of patent portfolios enable holders 
to realize true patent-like power in the modern marketplace to a  
degree which is impossible using individual patents alone.109
By contrast, while the scale-features of patent portfolios abstract 
away from their underlying structure, the diversity-features embrace it.  
That is, the diversity-features of patent portfolios reflect their status as 
the purposeful combination of distinct-but-related individual patents.  
For patent portfolios are not merely singular super-patents; instead, 
the inherent diversity created by the aggregation of many different 
patents offers holders a range of benefits—such as the ability to ad-
dress the risk and uncertainty fundamental to innovation—that can-
not be easily achieved absent the creation of such structures.110
Indeed, it is this dual quality of patent portfolios—the broad mar-
ketplace sweep of a super-patent, and the uncertainty-hedging ability 
of a diverse collection of assets—that both suggests the remarkable 
advantages of patent portfolios in the modern economy and explains 
their growing use. 
1.  Super-Patents:  The Scale-Features of Patent Portfolios 
In some ways, a collection of closely related patents defining a 
patent portfolio can be said to operate as a “super-patent” in much 
the same way that the holding of a U.S. patent grants the right to ex-
clude others from the scope of its claims—the holding of a patent 
portfolio will allow the holder to exclude others from the collective 
term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.” 
(quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964))); see also Kline, 
supra note 99, at 58 (“In the four years since IBM Corp. began a concerted campaign 
to make better use of its patent portfolio . . . the company has increased its annual pat-
ent license revenues from about $350 million in 1993 to more than $1 billion today.”). 
109 See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 99, at 30 (arguing that “the system is tilted heavily 
in favor of companies with large patent portfolios”); Edward E. David, Jr., The Univer-
sity-Academic Connection in Research:  Corporate Purposes and Social Responsibilities, 64 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 209, 211 (1982) (noting the relative importance of patent portfolios versus 
ownership of individual patents). 
110 The benefits of diversified portfolios have long been recognized in the field of 
asset management.  See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (intro-
ducing the concept of portfolio theory, for which Markowitz received the 1990 Nobel 
Prize in Economic Science); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON EMPLOYER STOCK IN 401(K) PLANS (2002), available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/401(k).pdf (“Asset diversification is a 
bedrock principle of prudent long-term investing.”); CHARLES P. JONES, INVESTMENTS:  
ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 566 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the Markowitz model and 
arguing that diversification is the number one rule of portfolio management); James 
K. Glassman, Diversify, Diversify, Diversify, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at A10 (arguing that 
employees should diversify their retirement portfolios). 
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scope of its claims.111  Where such patents are both (patentably) dis-
tinct112 yet cover coterminous subject matter,113 the breadth of the 
right to exclude conferred by a patent portfolio is essentially the sum 
of the individual patent rights. 
But the scale advantages of patent portfolios are more than merely 
additive.  The broader protection conferred by patent portfolios offers 
a range of benefits to the holder different in kind as well as size from a 
simple collection of unrelated individual patents.  We discuss some of 
these benefits out below. 
a.  Eases Subsequent In-House Innovation 
Holding a patent portfolio allows a firm to more confidently pro-
ceed along an innovation path.  The broader scope of protection en-
sures that a wider range of technological possibilities will be covered, 
which both increases the possibility that the end result of the research 
and development effort will be covered, and diminishes the concerns 
of infringement of others’ patents.114  This “freedom of movement”—
the ability to invent, implement, produce, and ship products with in-
house resources—is increasingly viewed as an advantage in today’s dy-
namic market environments, where speed and flexibility are economic 
imperatives.115
b.  Attracts Related External Innovations 
The scale-features of patent portfolios also enhance the ability to 
consolidate and coordinate related technological developments 
within the holding firm.116  The heft of a patent portfolio can provide 
111 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (defining patent infringement). 
112 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), (g) (2000) (barring double-patenting); see also Gen. 
Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle MbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (discussing the law of double-patenting). 
113 See discussion below regarding the challenges of portfolio construction. 
114 See, e.g., Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital:  Li-
censing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 
1997, at 8, 9 (“The portfolio approach reduces transactions costs and allows licensees 
freedom to design and manufacture without infringement.”). 
115 See David, supra note 109, at 209-19 (discussing the benefits of industry-
supported research in universities).  Apple Computer is also well-known for its ability 
to “stay ahead of the pack” by combining most features of innovation in-house.  See, 
e.g., Lee Gomes, Portals:  Apple Is Now Showing Some Real Substance Behind the Pretty Case, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2003, at B1 (noting that one way Apple abides by its own “Think 
Different” motto is by “insisting on doing both hardware and software in-house”). 
116 This point has empirical support.  See Donna J. Kelley & Mark P. Rice, Leverag-
ing the Value of Proprietary Technologies, J. SMALL BUS. MGMT., Jan. 2002, at 1, 9-10 (find-
ing statistical support for the relationship between patent portfolios and alliance for-
mation in new, technology-based firms); see also Rajiv P. Patel, Patent Portfolio Strategy for 
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a firm with a strong market position (either real or perceived) in a 
particular field, thus encouraging upstart innovators to combine their 
inventions with that of a portfolio holder, rather than seeking to de-
velop their own market niche.117  Thus, holding a patent portfolio can 
have a multiplier effect on the range of innovations that can be ac-
cessed by the firm.118
c.  Avoids Costly Litigation 
By deploying a patent portfolio with a broad sweep of exclusivity 
in a particular field, the holder is likely to dramatically reduce its in-
volvement in patent litigation.  This is for several reasons.  First, in 
cases where the portfolio holder believes that another has infringed, 
the broader total scope of protection created by the portfolio will only 
increase the chances that infringement will ultimately be proven, thus 
encouraging settlement.  Second, where the portfolio holder is the 
potential infringer, the chances that the holder will have a cognizable 
counterclaim based on one or more of its own patents is much higher, 
especially if the patent portfolio in question covers a significant por-
tion of the technological landscape—again, encouraging settlement 
rather than litigation.119  Third, where there are potential opposing 
claims of infringement—that is, where both a portfolio holder and an 
individual patentee have counterclaims—the existence of a patent 
Start-Up Companies:  A Primer, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Nov. 2002, at 1, 1 (advocating 
that companies carefully build patent portfolios to gain “a variety of business objec-
tives, such as bolstering market position, protecting R&D efforts, generating revenue, 
and encouraging favorable cross-licensing or settlement agreements”). 
117 See, e.g., Benjamin Pimentel, Inventors Patent Ideas To Pre-Empt Their Rivals; Com-
panies Then Must Buy Rights to the Devices, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 2003, at E1 (discussing 
how it is easier to partner with a massive-portfolio holder such as IBM than it is to 
square off against them); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the size of IBM’s patent 
portfolio). 
118 See, e.g., Larry Horn, Alternative Approaches to IP Management:  One-Stop Technology 
Platform Licensing, J. COM. BIOTECH., Jan. 2003, at 119, 119 (citing the example of the 
MPEG LA licensing scheme as a way to provide “the marketplace with fair, reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory access to a portfolio of worldwide essential patents under a single 
license”); see also Kelley & Rice, supra note 116, at 2 (“We maintain that by building a 
portfolio of technologies, the value of which can be communicated to others, a firm 
can offer something unique to potential partners and in turn capture advantage from 
the proprietary resources of these partners.”). 
119 The increased incentives to settle in this case come both from the increasing 
chances that the portfolio holder will win the case as well as the dramatically raised 
stakes in the litigation, which will encourage risk-averse parties to settle. 
 This point, like most others in this section, is recognized in the commercial world.  
See, e.g., John J. Egan & Ray Lupo, Protecting Venture Investments Against Patent Litigation, 
VENTURE CAP. J., Dec. 1, 2002, at 40, 41 (“A strong patent portfolio may even prevent a 
company from being accused of patent infringement in the first place, because a com-
petitor may see too much risk in suing a company holding a strong patent portfolio.”). 
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portfolio creates a potential imbalance in both the stakes of the litiga-
tion and the likelihood of success, which again encourages settlement 
rather than litigation.  And fourth, where multiple portfolio holders 
operate in a particular field, the greatly increased stakes—and in-
creased chances that both parties would be found liable—will dimin-
ish the appeal of litigation as a method of dispute resolution. Thus, in 
all scenarios, the existence of a patent portfolio (or multiple portfo-
lios) can be expected to help holders to avoid patent litigation.  In 
addition, note that this litigation-avoidance effect will be more pro-
nounced in proportion to the uncertainty surrounding individual pat-
ents, because the multiplier effect of the patent portfolio will tip the 
balance away from the 50-50 split that maximizes the possibility of liti-
gation—and, of course, this shift will always be in favor of the portfolio 
holder.120
d.  Improves Bargaining Position 
Holding a significant patent portfolio can improve the holder’s 
bargaining position along several dimensions.  First, and most obvi-
ously, the scale-effects of the portfolio—the quantity of potential in-
fringement claims, and the increased net likelihood that at least some 
such claims will be successful—offer a powerful leveraging tool that 
can improve the holder’s position with respect to competitors.121  But 
120 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 & fig.6 (1984) (“Figure 6 illustrates how the settlement ne-
gotiations of potential litigants select disputes for litigation.”).  As long as a portfolio of 
litigated patents was not completely covariant (which, under the patent law, they can-
not be), the likelihood of success—winning one patent litigation—for the portfolio 
holder rises as the number of litigated patents increases, even if the average possibility 
of winning on the basis of any single patent is rather low.  For example, the likelihood 
of success (assuming independence among the litigated patents) is 1-p(loss)N, where 
p(loss) is the average loss probability for single patents, and N is the number of patents 
litigated.  Even assuming an average loss probability of 75%, a portfolio of just three 
patents would bring the likelihood of success to the portfolio holder above 50% (to 
58%).  Note, of course, that the assumption of true independence is too strong: pat-
ents in a portfolio are by definition related, and certainly would have to be similar to 
be involved in a common litigation strategy.  But the basic point, we think, holds:  as 
portfolio size increases, the likelihood of success in the courts increases. 
 Additionally, while it is possible that the existence of a portfolio could in some 
cases bring the odds of victory closer to 50%, our point is that where there is distinct 
uncertainty—true equipoise in odds of success—the presence of a portfolio will likely 
tip the scale (in favor of the patentee).  Again, assuming an average loss probability of 
50%, litigating two patents implies a 75% likelihood of a win to the portfolio holder.  
Thanks to Dave Castleman for clarifying this point with us. 
121 Nee, supra note 99, at 220 (reporting analyst views that because “[m]ost large 
companies . . . have patent portfolios of their own . . . big players within an industry 
often sign cross-licensing agreements that let them use one another’s technology with-
out paying fees”). 
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holding a patent portfolio will also be beneficial in dealings with other 
players in the marketplace.122  For example, as noted above, a portfo-
lio holder will be a particularly attractive partner for firms dedicated 
to improving or extending existing technology:  the strong market po-
sition established by a significant portfolio will both improve the 
chances for success of any follow-on products, as well as diminish the 
possibility for advancement where an agreement is not reached.  Note 
as well that this same marketplace advantage means that the portfolio 
holder will also have an improved position vis-à-vis others in the prod-
uct chain, such as suppliers and distributors.  Thus, one can expect 
portfolio holders to be able to reach more beneficial arrangements 
with a variety of parties.123
e.  Improves Defensive Positions 
Patents, of course, can play a defensive rather than offensive 
role—serving to dissuade litigation (and threats thereof) by others in 
the field, because of the threat (real or implied) of retaliatory litiga-
tion.124  As we noted above, however, the relative lack of value of indi-
vidual patents calls into question their defensive (as well as offensive) 
utility.  Patent portfolios, on the other hand, can address this concern:  
the scale-effects of a portfolio mean that the broader array of possible 
infringement claims (and the concomitant greater net likelihood of 
success) allow significant patent portfolios to serve as important de-
fensive mechanisms in a highly litigious environment. 
f.  Increases the Firm’s Voice in the Politics of the Patent System 
As the U.S. patent system gains prominence for its importance in 
regulating the innovation-driven modern economy, the politics of the 
patent system become increasingly contentious and polarized.125  Ac-
122 See, e.g., Patel, supra note 116, at 1 (asserting that a well-crafted portfolio can 
encourage cross-licensing as well as settlement agreements with other companies). 
123 See, e.g., David Rohde, Lucent Hardball, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 22, 1999, at 75 
(reporting a competitor’s claim that Lucent Technologies is using its patent portfolio 
in older technologies “as large bargaining chips to cross-license what it doesn’t have, 
and sometimes mount some rather formidable barriers against competition”). 
124 See, e.g., John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking 
Patent Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 855 (2002) (describing the practice in the 
semiconductor industry of acquiring patent portfolios for their defensive benefits). 
125 See, e.g., OXFAM INT’L, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 56, ROBBING THE POOR TO PAY 
THE RICH?  HOW THE UNITED STATES KEEPS MEDICINES FROM THE WORLD’S POOREST 
(2003), available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp031201_robbing_medicines_ 
US.pdf (criticizing United States patent policy in developing countries); Electronic 
Freedom Foundation, The Patent-Busting Project, http://www.eff.org/patent/ (pro-
moting the invalidation of allegedly illegitimate patents); Update:  Bush to Close Hatch-
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cordingly, having a “seat at the table” during any negotiations con-
cerning patent law changes is (and will increasingly be) important to 
the modern firm.  Holding a significant patent portfolio can ensure 
that firms are viewed by regulators and legislators as “players” in the 
patent debates.126
g.  Enhances Efforts to Attract Capital 
The scale-effects of patent portfolios will improve holders’ ability 
to attract and retain capital investment.  Unlike individual patents, a 
significant patent portfolio is (for the reasons noted above, and oth-
ers) a substantial asset.  Further, while the dubious value of individual 
patents calls into question their ability to provide meaningful signals 
about the firm to external parties, patent portfolios do not suffer from 
this defect—and thus will provide information to the capital markets 
about the competitiveness, savvy, and long-term prospects of the hold-
ing firm. 
*      *      * 
 
In short, the scale-features of patent portfolios—the increased 
breadth of protection and the corresponding net increase in the like-
lihood of successfully enforcing the scope of protection—offer a 
number of (mostly familiar) benefits to the holder.  In an environ-
ment where individual patents are increasingly of questionable value, 
it is the patent portfolio that is assuming the role of providing mean-
ingful patent-type protection in the modern marketplace. 
2.  The Diversity-Features of Patent Portfolios 
The benefits of patent portfolios, however, go well beyond their 
status as de facto super-patents.  For patent portfolios are not simply 
singular items, but rather a constructed array of related-but-distinct 
individual patents, with each component patent representing a frac-
Waxman Loopholes, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1 (quoting President 
Bush advocating stronger patent protection for drug companies); Maureen O’Gara, 
Anti-Patent Banner Raised, LINUX BUS. NEWS, Aug. 18, 2003, http:// 
www.linuxbusinessweek.com/story/35312.htm (discussing patent disputes in the open 
source movement).  For more broad-based patent reform proposals, see FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 
10/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending standards and procedures for evaluating ques-
tionable patents); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 103 
(discussing the benefits of a new procedure for reviewing patent validity). 
126 Admittedly, it might be possible to achieve much of this benefit without having 
a purposefully constructed portfolio, but instead simply having a large number of per-
haps unrelated patents. 
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tion of the total.  This diversity—the fact that no single patent deter-
mines the value—is a major benefit of patent portfolios.  By distribut-
ing the importance of the total portfolio across the constituent indi-
vidual patents, a patent portfolio allows holders to significantly hedge 
against aspects of risk and uncertainty that are endemic to innovation 
in the modern economy.  Specifically, note the following benefits of 
the diversity of patents in a portfolio. 
a.  Addresses Ex Ante Uncertainty Related to Technology 
Innovation is a notoriously uncertain business, with no guarantees 
of success and often little visibility concerning future conditions.  
Firms operating in an innovation-driven environment understand that 
future technological developments will make or break their research 
and development efforts:  an early decision to pursue a particular 
technology or research path can, perhaps years later, turn out to be 
prescient or misguided.  Patent portfolios can help ameliorate some 
of this uncertainty by allowing holders to secure protections along a 
broader swath of the technological-development path than would be 
possible with individual patents alone.  For example, suppose that a 
firm decides to pursue a development path for semiconductors that 
includes the use of a newly developed material to replace the silicon 
substrate.  By developing a patent portfolio focused on a range of 
types or features of materials, the firm can address the obvious ex ante 
uncertainty about the precise nature of the material that will ulti-
mately be successful as development continues.  Indeed, a portfolio-
driven strategy will lead a firm to seek patent protection not only for 
materials that it considers most likely to yield results, but for as many 
distinct-but-related materials as reasonably possible.127  A substantial, 
well-planned patent portfolio allows a holder to seamlessly adjust for 
changing technology as it attempts to navigate the path of a research 
and development effort. 
b.  Expands the Freedom of Research Inquiry 
A closely related benefit of patent portfolios is that they allow 
holders to expand the avenues of their technological development ef-
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (describing disclosure requirements for patent ap-
plications).  Because at least nominal research must be conducted to support patent-
ing, a portfolio-driven strategy would thus encourage firms to either (a) broaden—at 
least slightly—their research focus, to encompass distinct-but-related technology op-
portunities, or (b) seek to acquire such research (or patents) from external sources.  
This in turn suggests that one effect of patent portfolios is to encourage the consolida-
tion of distinct-but-related technologies and associated patents under a single firm’s 
control. 
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forts.  That is, the diverse nature of a patent portfolio means that re-
searchers can freely move into distinct-but-related fields of inquiry 
with the assurance that patent protection is available; given the diver-
sity of protection provided by a portfolio, such associated research can 
be conducted with less fear of infringement and a greater expectation 
of exclusivity.  Thus, the semiconductor researchers posited above can 
more freely engage in research beyond the narrow focus of the par-
ticular project at hand, perhaps investigating the use of the new mate-
rials in other applications—with possibly important benefits accruing 
to the firm.128
c.  Addresses Uncertainty Related to Future Market Conditions 
Technology, of course, is not the only uncertainty in the innova-
tion-driven marketplace.  The vagaries of future market conditions—
for example, the availability and costs of materials—can at least in part 
be addressed by holding a diverse patent portfolio. 
d.  Addresses Uncertainty Related to Future Competitors 
Holding a patent portfolio can also hedge against future moves by 
one’s competitors in the marketplace.  The diversity-features of patent 
portfolios mean that the firm’s future innovation path will be broader 
in potential (as described above) and thus less susceptible to interfer-
ence from competitors’ patent-related and market-related moves.  For 
example, if a firm at time t=0 has a significant market and/or innova-
tion advantage, the construction of a substantial patent portfolio fo-
cused on that advantage will provide an enduring (albeit not perma-
nent) hedge against the movement of existing competitors or the 
emergence of new challengers.  Again, the diversity-features of the 
portfolio structure mean that such a hedge will be more resilient to 
uncertainty than would be possible in the individual patent context. 
e.  Addresses Uncertainty in the Patent Law 
Perhaps most significantly, the diversity-features of patent portfo-
lios offer a hedge against uncertainty related to the patent law itself.  
That is, because no single individual patent conclusively determines 
the value of a portfolio, any uncertainty in the law that could alter the 
value of individual patents will have less impact.  The patent law has 
128 Take, for example, the 3M case example, where researchers are encouraged to 
inquire beyond their narrow, assigned research projects. See, e.g., Thomas A. Stewart, 
3M Fights Back, FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 1996 at 94 (“One of 3M’s crazy-like-a-fox traits is fa-
mous—the ‘15% rule’ that tells researchers to spend that much of their time working 
on something other than their primary project.”). 
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undergone significant transition in recent decades, and while some of 
these shifts have arguably resulted in greater certainty,129 there are key 
areas of expanding uncertainty.  For example, statistical studies show 
that the determination of claim construction issues—crucial for both 
validity and scope inquiries—is highly variable, and dependent upon 
the identity of judges hearing the case.130  The Federal Circuit has also 
been engaging in a decade-long project to curtail (or at least define) 
the impact of the doctrine of equivalents, resulting in uncertainty 
concerning the future viability of that regime in expanding the scope 
of valid patents.  The rise of a newly developed “written description” 
requirement casts doubt on the validity of many patents, especially 
those in areas of rapidly developing or uncertain technology.131  This 
(arguably growing) level of uncertainty related to the validity and 
scope of patents only increases the relative benefits of patent portfo-
lios because the value of a portfolio is not tied directly to a single pat-
ent (or to a small number of patents), and because many of these un-
certainties turn on very fact-specific details of the individual patents 
129 The most notable shift has been the creation of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit.  Perhaps the seminal work considering its formation and 
theoretical basis is Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1078-79 (2001) 
(suggesting that the Federal Circuit has failed to achieve greater predictability in pat-
ent litigation); John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:  Ad-
ministrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 111 (2000) (considering future 
innovations in claim interpretation that might solve procedural inefficiencies inherent 
in the current system of consolidated Federal Circuit review of patent appeals); Lem-
ley, supra note 3, at 1496 (asserting that a more intensive patent evaluation process is 
unwarranted); Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Man-
tras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 (2001) (calling for the Federal Circuit to accept in-
terlocutory appeals of district court claim interpretations in order to promote cer-
tainty); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 82 
(2000) (contending that the Federal Circuit uses a theory of claim construction called 
“hypertextualism” and concluding that the use of this theory is responsible for the 
court’s failure to achieve certainty and coherence in its jurisprudence); Arti K. Rai, En-
gaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has arrogated power over 
fact finding to the detriment of the patent system); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research:  Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 
(1999) (asserting that legal change has been out of step with the “instrumental goals of 
intellectual property”). 
130 See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Em-
pirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163-70 (2004) (dem-
onstrating that different judges may come to dramatically different conclusions on 
claim construction issues). 
131 See, e.g., Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998) (noting that in light of recent deci-
sions, numerous “patents on pioneering inventions are in danger of being held inva-
lid”). 
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involved (or even on the judges deciding the case), the portfolio 
holder can be more assured of the existence of a field of protection 
than would otherwise be possible. 
3.  An Inherent Tension:  Scale Versus Diversity 
One important insight into the dual-form benefits of patent port-
folios (scale and diversity) is that substantial tension exists between 
these two goals.  That is, as noted above, effective patent portfolios are 
both sizable—covering an expanse of closely related subject matter—
and diverse—composed of distinct individual patents, thus diminishing 
the importance of any specific patentable subject matter.  Yet maxi-
mizing one dimension will degrade the other.  For example, increas-
ing the size of a portfolio entails obtaining additional closely related 
patents (ideally, patents whose subject matter abuts existing holdings, 
so as to create a relatively seamless “super-patent”), but increasing the 
diversity of a portfolio is best achieved by obtaining additional patents 
with more distinct subject matters.  A maximally diverse patent portfo-
lio would be composed of individual patents that are virtually unre-
lated (and thus, in our definition, would fail to be a portfolio alto-
gether).  But such an atomized portfolio would be relatively 
ineffective in size-terms because of the significant gaps in subject mat-
ter coverage between constituent patents, creating what might be 
called a “swiss cheese effect.”  These holes in protection would result 
in far less confidence, for example, about the actual scope of enforce-
able coverage than would be the case where the subject matter of the 
individual patents was roughly coterminous.  Further, an overly atom-
ized patent portfolio would also provide significant openings for other 
firms to engage in similar (competing) research and development, 
and even to procure closely related patents themselves, thus greatly 
diminishing the value of the portfolio. 
Similarly, the maximization of a portfolio’s scale-effects will have 
negative consequences for diversity.  That is, such a patent portfolio 
would be constructed for maximum density, with constituent patents 
covering small portions of directly coterminous subject matter.  But 
this close relationship between individual patents—a benefit for scale-
features—undermines the diversity of the portfolio (which derives 
from the differences between the individual patents), and thus dimin-
ishes the importance of diversity related benefits. 
This observation—the tension between scale and diversity—
suggests that effective patent portfolios will be carefully crafted affairs, 
where patenting decisions are made in light of these twin goals.  This 
in turn suggests that patent portfolio construction is unquestionably a 
skill-oriented task, one that some firms will perform better (and per-
haps far better) than others.  Indeed, the dramatic benefits of well-
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constructed patent portfolios mean that there is almost certainly a 
market value in such activities, a fact which is borne out by the recent 
emergence of firms dedicated to patent portfolio construction.132
C.  Paradox, Resolved:  The Value of Quantity 
The tension between scale and diversity, however, does have an 
obvious solution:  more constituent patents.  As the number of indi-
vidual patents involved in a portfolio increases, the structure becomes 
both more sizeable (covering a broader array of subject matter) and 
more diverse (covering a greater difference of subject matters).  Simi-
larly, the challenges inherent in portfolio construction identified 
above—the appropriate strategic focus between size and diversity—
diminish as the number of obtainable patents increases.  In this sense, 
high-volume patenting behavior is itself a way to diminish the impor-
tance of individual patenting decisions, because simply adding total 
patents to the portfolio will increase both its scale and diversity.  Put 
simply, in a portfolio-driven era of patenting, high-volume patenting is 
the overwhelmingly dominant decision. 
Thus the explanatory power of the patent portfolio theory in the 
modern patenting environment becomes clear:  firms patent heavily 
to maximize the benefits of patent portfolios, and such benefits are 
directly determined by the quantity of patents assembled.  In other 
words, the marginal value of increasing the size and diversity of the 
patent portfolio is substantially greater than the marginal value of the 
individual patent itself.  Thus, obtaining the patent is advantageous 
even if the value of the individual patent is less than its acquisition 
cost.  Indeed, under this theory, patenting decisions are essentially 
unrelated to the value of the individual patent.  Instead, the question 
is whether the additional marginal value of adding the patent to the 
portfolio is greater than the acquisition cost. 
This last point exposes another facet of the portfolio theory:  the 
benefits of quantity, while substantial, are not unlimited.  At some 
point there will be diminishing returns from adding patents to a port-
folio, as the marginal value of the addition of more patents is out-
weighed by the acquisition cost.  The insight of the patent portfolio 
theory, of course, is the recognition that this inflection point will oc-
cur at a quantity of patents far beyond that which can be explained by 
the marginal value of the patents themselves. 
It is important to understand that the patent portfolio theory does 
not suggest that there are no limits to the value of portfolios or the 
132 See, e.g., Eric W. Pfeiffer, Mine Games:  Companies Are Coining Intellectual Property, 
FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 60, 61-62 (discussing firms such as ThinkFire and ipValue 
that specialize in the exploitation of patent portfolios). 
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desirable quantity of patents.  As the benefits noted above are maxi-
mized—for example, where an enduring, long-term market position is 
established, or a very broad range of possible innovation paths are 
protected—the marginal value of increasing the benefits will ulti-
mately fall below the costs.  Note, however, that the value-limits of a 
patent portfolio have little or no relationship to the value of the un-
derlying patents, again confirming the intuition that modern patent-
ing decisions are and should be independent of the value of the pat-
ents themselves. 
III.  PATENT PORTFOLIOS IN ACTION:  CASE STUDIES 
In this Part, we will demonstrate that a portfolio approach to un-
derstanding the value of patents is not merely a theoretic nicety, but 
rather the dominant approach to patenting in the real world.  In par-
ticular, we will present three case studies that illustrate how companies 
employ the portfolio theory to gain and preserve a dominant position 
in their respective industries.  It bears emphasis that the examples we 
use here are highly representative.  There is ample evidence that the 
desire to achieve a strong patent portfolio shapes the patenting activi-
ties of virtually all innovating firms. 
A.  Dominating a Technology via a Patent Portfolio:  The Case of Qualcomm 
Qualcomm rose to prominence in the mid-1990s as part of the 
wave of technology firms that capitalized on the value of their patent 
portfolios by aggressively pursuing licensing agreements.133  The leap 
to superstardom, however, did not occur until 1999, when the com-
pany began spinning off divisions in order to focus squarely on its in-
tellectual property portfolio, and saw its stock soar over 2000% (note-
worthy even amidst the flurry of speculation driving the dot-com 
bubble).134  Despite suffering through the subsequent market down-
turn, the company has experienced significant growth over the past 
133 See, e.g., Mark Voorhees, Ethereal Asset, AM. LAW., May 2004, at 118, 119 (noting 
that in the 1990s, Qualcomm “started fattening [its] bottom line from licensing”).  
Some experts have estimated that in the 1990s, patent licensing revenue grew from $15 
billion to over $100 billion per year.  See, e.g., RIVETTE & KLINE, supra note 1, at 5 (de-
scribing the general increase in licensing revenue from 1990 to 1998). 
134 See, e.g., Simon Romero, Qualcomm’s Shrinking Act Could Pay Off Big:  Company 
Prospers by Shedding Divisions and Focusing Fiercely on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at 
C1 (discussing Qualcomm’s dramatic increase in market capitalization); Gregory 
Zuckerman & Terzah Ewing, Stocks Retreat a Little After Big Day, Decade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
31, 1999, at C1 (same). 
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three years, including a $200 million increase in revenue from its li-
censing division.135
This meteoric success can be traced back to 1989, when the four-
year-old startup introduced “code division multiple access” (CDMA) 
wireless technology as a better alternative to the “time division multi-
ple access” (TDMA) digital system which had just been endorsed by 
the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) after a 
two-year dispute over the industry standards.136  Despite the network 
externalities which created a substantial barrier to entry into the wire-
less market at that time,137 CDMA eventually supplanted TDMA, 
largely by virtue of being a superior technology.138
Qualcomm’s insight was not simply in championing CDMA, but in 
anticipating future developments and aggressively pursuing an array 
of patents covering diverse applications of the standard.139  The bene-
fits to Qualcomm of this approach are two-fold:  the company gener-
135 See QUALCOMM, INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2003), available at 
http://www.qualcomm.com/ir/annualreport/QCOM_AR2003.pdf (reporting $1 bil-
lion in technology licensing revenues for fiscal 2003); QUALCOMM, INC., 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 47 (2002), available at http://www.qualcomm.com/ir/annualreport/ 
QCOM_AR2002.pdf (reporting $836 million in licensing revenues for fiscal 2002 and 
$772 million for fiscal 2001).  Recently, Business 2.0 ranked the company thirtieth on 
its list of fastest-growing technology firms.  B2 100: Fastest-Growing Tech Companies, 
BUSINESS 2.0, June 2004, at 115, 117. 
136 Dean Takahashi, PacTel Cellular Takes a Gamble on Technology, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
26, 1990, at D1. 
137 See, e.g., Nee, supra note 99, at 213 (“In early 1989, when [Qualcomm CEO Dr. 
Irwin Jacobs] first approached wireless carriers to pitch CDMA, no Las Vegas bookie 
would have given Qualcomm any odds of success.  AT&T, Motorola, and others had 
already opted for the so-called TDMA (time division multiple access) digital stan-
dard.”).  Five years later, numerous industry experts still predicted that Qualcomm 
would be unable to overcome its competitive disadvantage.  See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, 
Qualcomm’s Digital Technology Wins Praise, but Marketing Delays Are Raising Questions, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1994, at C2 (quoting an analyst as saying, “[i]t’s too late for Qual-
comm, at least in this round of technological change”). 
138 See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Modem Company Growing In a Competitive Market, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at C6 (“Most analysts agree that CDMA offers better performance 
than TDMA.”); Justine Lau, Operators Reject New 3G License, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at 
27 (“CDMA is a widely used US network standard while TDMA is a less common stan-
dard used in mobile telephony.”). 
139 Currently, the company has over 3000 patents and patent applications covering 
CDMA and related wireless technologies.  2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 3. 
2005] PATENT PORTFOLIOS 45 
 
ates a dual revenue stream140 and prevents competitors from entering 
any aspect of the CDMA market.141
Qualcomm’s official statements (in annual reports, press releases, 
and presentations to both investors and the media) make it clear that 
the company views the portfolio, rather than the individual patent, as 
the relevant level of abstraction for managing intellectual property as-
sets.142  Filings with the SEC further reflect a recognition of the portfo-
lio as a distinct commodity.143  Finally, the company consistently em-
phasizes the growing number of patents for which it applies and 
receives each year, as well as the broad applicability of the portfolio as 
a whole to a wide range of wireless technologies.144
140 In addition to income derived from its own products and services, the company 
receives upfront fees from licensing partners as well as ongoing royalty payments based 
on the sales of equipment incorporating Qualcomm technology.  Id. at 34. 
141 See, e.g., Nee, supra note 99, at 220 (stating that Qualcomm’s patents “make up 
a portfolio so broad and deep that [according to general counsel Steven Altman] ‘you 
can’t deploy a CDMA product without infringing’ . . . .”). 
142 See, e.g., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 3 (“QUALCOMM’s extensive 
patent portfolio has been recognized as essential to existing and proposed interna-
tional CDMA standards . . . .”); Qualcomm, Inc., Q1 2004 Earnings Conference Call 
(Jan. 21, 2004), available at WESTLAW 1/21/04 FINDISCLOSURE 17:30:00 (“Qual-
comm’s license agreements with essentially all of the world’s leading wireless equip-
ment manufacturers have created a well established market value for our patent port-
folio . . . .”); Press Release, Qualcomm, Inc., QUALCOMM and Alcatel Enter into a 
CDMA Infrastructure Patent License Agreement (July 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.qualcomm.com/press/releases/2002/press1062.html (announcing a li-
censing agreement that “further validates the strength of QUALCOMM’s patent port-
folio”); Press Release, Qualcomm, Inc., QUALCOMM Wins Three More Patent Oppo-
sitions in Korea and Europe (Jan. 23, 2001), available at http://www.qualcomm.com/ 
press/releases/2001/press137.html (quoting Qualcomm’s chief patent strategist as 
saying that individual patents being upheld demonstrates “the strength and necessity 
of QUALCOMM’s CDMA patent portfolio”); Presentation, Qualcomm, Inc., Friedman 
Billings Ramsey 8th Annual Growth Investor Conference, Slide 13 (June 3, 2004), 
available at http://www.qualcomm.com/ir/ppt/pj_fbr060304.pdf (“QUALCOMM’s 
Unique Patent Position:  Patent Portfolio is a Strong Asset.”). 
143 See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Sept. 28, 2003), 
available at http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/download.php?type=PDF&ipage=2408390& 
cik=804328 (“We rely primarily on patent, copyright, trademark and trade secret laws, 
as well as nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements and other methods, to protect 
our proprietary information, technologies and processes, including our patent portfo-
lio.”). 
144 See, e.g., Dr. Irwin Mark Jacobs & Anthony S. Thornley, Letter to Stockholders, 
in QUALCOMM, INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 26 (claiming that Qual-
comm’s success “is derived in part from the strength of our ever-growing patent portfo-
lio. More than 125 manufacturers have license agreements with QUALCOMM Tech-
nology Licensing (QTL) covering cdmaOne and CDMA2000 applications, and more 
than 50 manufacturers have licenses covering WCDMA and TD-SCDMA standards.”); 
Press Release, Qualcomm, Inc., United States Patent Office Reaffirms the Validity of 
Important QUALCOMM CDMA Patent (March 23, 1999)), available at 
http://www.qualcomm.com/press/releases/1999/press458.html (“[N]o single patent 
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Table 3:  Qualcomm’s Yearly and Cumulative U.S. Patents145
 
 Issued Total 
Jan. 1999 245 815 
Jan. 2000 388 1264 
Jan. 2001 531 1582 
Sept. 2002 888 2451 
Sept. 2003 n/a Over 3000 
 
B.  Building Scale and Diversity:  The Case of IBM 
When it comes to numbers, nobody beats Big Blue.146  Since 1994, 
IBM has amassed over 25,000 U.S. patents, far more than any other 
company, each year ranking first on the USPTO’s list of top patent 
earners.147  Its closest competitor in that regard, Canon Kabushiki Kai-
 
is critical to QUALCOMM’s coverage of second or third generation CDMA wireless 
standards because QUALCOMM holds dozens of patents that are essential to the lead-
ing standards . . . .”). 
145 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 135. 
146 At least one intellectual property lawyer has suggested that “IBM is perhaps the 
most formidable IP litigation opponent imaginable, not least because of its thermonu-
clear patent portfolio.”  Clegg Ivey, Open Season on Open Source, 51 LA. B.J. 440, 441 
(2004).  Currently, the company focuses its portfolio-building efforts in six relatively 
broad areas:  microelectronics, server technologies, storage systems, network and e-
business computing, display and printer technologies, and software.  IBM, State-of-the-
Art Patent Portfolio, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/portfolio.shtml 
[hereinafter IBM, State-of-the-Art]. 
147 Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 Organizations 
Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 11, 2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/ 
speeches/05-03.htm; Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 12, 2004),  http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/speeches/04-01.htm; Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Releases An-
nual List of Top 10 Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 13, 2003), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/03-01.htm; Press Release, USPTO, 
USPTO Releases Annual List of 10 Organizations Receiving Most Patents (Jan. 10, 
2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/02-01.htm; Press Release, 
USPTO, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 Organizations Receiving Most U.S. 
Patents (Jan. 10, 2001), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/01-02.htm; 
Press Release, USPTO, IBM Repeats at Top of PTO’s Annual List of 10 Organizations 
Receiving Most Patents (Jan. 11, 2000), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/ 
speeches/00-03.htm; Press Release, USPTO, IBM Repeats at Top of PTO’s Annual List 
of 10 Organizations Receiving Most Patents (Jan. 8, 1999), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/speeches/99-1.htm; Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Announces Top 
Patent Earners (Jan. 12, 1998), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-
01.htm; Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Announces Last Year’s Top Patent Earners:  
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sha, received almost ten thousand fewer patents during the same pe-
riod.148  Moreover, the number of ideas being patented each year is on 
the rise—several times in the past decade, IBM set new records for the 
most U.S. patents received by an organization in a single year.149
In the 1980s, IBM struggled as the national consciousness came to 
associate excellence in technology with foreign-produced goods.150  
Moreover, the once-progressive company grew stagnant, falling from 
its perch as the leader in innovation.151 But even then, IBM recognized 
the bargaining value of a robust portfolio,152 as well as the leverage 
such a portfolio could provide when seeking to compel licensing 
agreements from potential infringers (perhaps unscrupulously).153  Still, 
after a decade of very public management snafus, analysts and 
economists were writing the company’s obituary.154
The turn-around began with the arrival of Lou Gerstner as CEO in 
1993, appointed to replace John Akers after the company suffered its 
worst year ever.155  Among the changes instituted under Gerstner’s 
watch:  substantially increasing efforts to exploit the company’s intel-
lectual property assets,156 mandating a narrower focus on less theoreti-
IBM Again Tops the List (Jan. 27, 1997), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/ 
speeches/97-02.txt; Press Release, USPTO, IBM Leads List of Top 11 Patent Recipients 
for 1995 (Jan. 30, 1996), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/96-03.txt. 
148 See press releases cited supra note 147. 
149 See press releases cited supra note 147. 
150 See, e.g., BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Studios 1985) (Doc:  “No wonder this 
circuit failed – it says ‘Made in Japan.’”; Marty:  “What do you mean, Doc?  All the best 
stuff is made in Japan.”). 
151 See, e.g., JAMES C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST 224 (1994) (“IBM 
got conservative in the 1980s, protecting its mainframe line.  It lost sight of its own 
past.”). 
152 Bob Davis, Computer Firms Turn to Patents, Once Viewed as Weak Protection, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 28, 1986, at 33, 33 (quoting an attorney for IBM as saying “[h]aving a patent 
portfolio is important to obtaining access to other people’s patents”). 
153 Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 44, 45-46 (quoting a 
lawyer for IBM as saying “maybe you don’t infringe these seven patents.  But we have 
10,000 U.S. patents.  Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in 
New York] and find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy 
and just pay us $20 million?”) (brackets in original).  But see Jonathan Krim, Patenting 
Air or Protecting Property?  Information Age Invents a New Problem, WASH. POST., Dec. 11, 
2003, at E1 (“Jerry Rosenthal, IBM’s vice president of intellectual property, denied that 
the incident occurred the way Reback described.”). 
154 See, e.g., CHARLES H. FERGUSON & CHARLES R. MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS:  HOW 
THE WEST CAN WIN IN A POST-IBM WORLD xii (1993) (“[T]here is a serious possibility 
that IBM is finished as a force in the industry.”). 
155 See, e.g., Patricia Sellers & David Kirkpatrick, Can This Man Save IBM?, 
FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1993, at 63, 63 (“Gerstner [replaced] CEO John Akers in January 
after the company’s worst year ever.”). 
156 See, e.g., Kline, supra note 99, at 58 (describing a $650 million increase in yearly 
patent licensing revenue, due to “better use of [IBM’s] patent portfolio”). 
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cal and more product-oriented research,157 and slashing the R&D 
budget158 while simultaneously initiating a campaign to increase the 
number of patents the company received.159  This led not only to the 
remarkable growth of the company’s patent portfolio, but also to a 
significantly reduced ratio of research dollars spent to patents earned.  
Even taking into account the approximately twenty-eight months re-
quired for the average patent prosecution,160 patent intensity—patents 
obtained per R&D dollar—at IBM has exploded.161
 
157 See, e.g., Raju Narisetti, IBM Wins 1,724 Patents for No. 1 Spot On ‘97 List, but 
Fruits of R&D Fall 8%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at B16 (“Some observers have won-
dered if IBM’s cuts and its narrower focus on product-oriented research would prompt 
its scientists to avoid long-shot projects that nevertheless might yield a home run.”). 
158 See, e.g., Robert Buderi, Into the Big Blue Yonder, TECH. REV., July/Aug. 1999, at 
46, 48 (“Gerstner slash[ed] nearly $2 billion from IBM’s $5.1 billion annual R&D 
budget.”). 
159 Louise Kehoe, International Company News: IBM Heads List for US Patents, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at 29. 
160 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 385 (1994) (determining that the mean prosecution time is 864 days). 
161 See Figure 3 (demonstrating a nearly six-fold rise in patent intensity (patents 
per million dollars of R&D budget) during the decade 1992-2003.).  The following ta-
ble presents the raw data: 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Patents 842 1,107 1,298 1,383 1,867 1,724 2,657 2,756 2,866 3,411 3,288 3,415 
R&D* 6,522 5,558 4,363 4,170 4,654 4,877 5,046 5,723 5,084 4,986 4,750 5,077 
* dollars in millions. 
 IBM Annual Reports, 1994-2003. 
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Figure 3:  Shifting to a Portfolio Strategy: 
IBM’s Exploding Patent Intensity162
 
By some measures, IBM’s portfolio-building success has come at 
the price of its patent quality:  although the undisputed leader based 
on sheer numbers, the company lags behind peers such as Microsoft, 
Cisco, and Sun Microsystems on indexes that measure how often a 
company’s patents are cited as prior art and how close its portfolio is 
to the cutting edge of research.163 Nevertheless, IBM’s dramatic over-
haul paid off:  the portfolio provides the company’s engineers with 
the freedom to experiment unhindered by concerns of infringing on 
others’ patents,164 and IBM has turned intellectual property licensing 
into a “fine art”165 that has generated over $10 billion in the last dec-
ade.166  Indeed, the licensing division has become so profitable and 
 
162 See supra note 161. 
163 See, e.g., Evan I. Schwartz, Patents Go Global, TECH. REV., May 2003, at 55, 60 
(explaining that because of IBM’s extensive patent portfolio, “IBM engineers [are able 
to] simply design the best product possible without worrying about patent concerns.”). 
164 See, e.g., Julie Moran Alterio, Taking the Measure of Patents, J. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2003, 
at 1D (“IBM engineers simply design the best product possible without worrying about 
patent concerns, said Jerry Rosenthal, vice president for property and licensing at 
IBM.”). 
165 More Rembrandts in the Attic, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 53. 
166 John Teresko, IBM’s Patent/Licensing Connection, INDUSTRY WEEK, Mar. 2003, at 
16; IBM, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2003).  Annual licensing revenue grew from approxi-
mately $350 million in 1993 to slightly over $1 billion in 2003, with a high-water mark 
in 1999 and 2000, when the licensing revenue was over $1.5 billion each year.  
Narisetti, supra note 157, at B16; IBM, ANNUAL REPORTS 2000-2003, available at 
http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/. 
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efficient that IBM now consults with other firms on how to maximize 
income from their own patent portfolios.167
C.  Assembling a Patent Portfolio from Alternative Sources: 
The Case of Gemstar 
Henry Yuen launched Gemstar in 1989 with a simple dream:  to 
help the nation program its VCRs.168  He (along with partner David 
Kwoh) developed an algorithm for converting information about a TV 
show into a short string of numbers; convinced newspapers and TV 
Guide to carry the codes in their listings; and designed a set-top box 
to convert those codes back into instructions telling the device the 
date, time, and channel of the program the end-user wanted to re-
cord.169  Gemstar’s device, the VCR Plus+, was an immediate success, 
and Yuen raked in millions.170
As the company grew, it sought to apply its patented technology to 
related emerging fields.  Yuen’s vision was for Gemstar to assemble a 
portfolio of patents which could be used to claim coverage over all as-
pects of on-screen guides and interactive program listings.171  Al-
though the company conducted some research and development in-
house, Gemstar’s primary method of expansion was to acquire smaller 
companies with potentially valuable patents,172 and to use the threat of 
expensive infringement litigation to force competitors either into li-
censing deals or out of the field.173
Gemstar soared through the 1990s with a string of high-profile 
successes, most notably the acquisition of TV Guide (which resolved a 
167 Teresko, supra note 166, at 16. 
168 See David Churbuck, Success Formula, FORBES, May 27, 1991, at 334 (recounting 
the genesis and early success of Gemstar).  The firm was originally founded in 1986 as 
a real-estate holding company.  Walter Hamilton & Karen Kaplan, Can Gemstar 
Keep Rising?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at D1. 
169 Churbuck, supra note 168, at 334. 
170 Id. 
171 See Hamilton & Kaplan, supra note 168, at D1 (analyzing Gemstar’s then-
imminent entry into the interactive program listings market). 
172 See, e.g., Stacy Kravetz, Gemstar to Buy Rival StarSight in a Stock Swap, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 26, 1996, at 11 (detailing Gemstar’s acquisition of StarSight, a rival with valuable 
interactive television program guide patents). 
173 See, e.g., Jonathan Fahey, Screen Grab, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 52, 52  
(“[Gemstar’s Henry Yuen] forced or coaxed giants Microsoft, Motorola and AOL into 
licensing deals, using his array of patents as weapons.”); Anne Colden, EchoStar Coun-
tersues Gemstar, DENVER POST, Dec. 6, 2000, at C2 (quoting EchoStar’s antitrust com-
plaint as alleging “Gemstar wields its patent portfolio, which it claims covers any IPG 
product on the market, to coerce companies into license agreements containing nu-
merous anti-competitive terms”). 
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long-standing patent dispute).174  But Yuen’s aggressive strategy 
prompted an industry backlash,175 and a series of courtroom defeats 
led competitors and licensees to question the strength of Gemstar’s 
patent portfolio.176  Yuen was finally ousted in 2002 following revela-
tions that the company was overstating revenue.177
Today, Gemstar still maintains a portfolio of over 260 patents  
on listing and interactive technologies,178 and numerous analysts be-
lieve the size of this portfolio, combined with a less combative attitude 
towards licensees, leaves the company poised for a long-term domi-
nant role in the industry.179
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS 
A.  The Explanatory Power of the Portfolio Theory 
As we argued above, the patent portfolio theory has profound im-
plications for the way we understand the modern patent system.  By 
recognizing that the true value of patents inheres not in their individ-
ual worth, but in their status as components of strategically developed 
portfolios, this theory allows for a far richer (and a more empirically 
accurate) view of what drives current patenting behavior. 
Accordingly, a major prescriptive message that emanates from this 
paper is straightforward:  research and scholarship that examines the 
patent system must do so in the context of patent portfolios.  The era 
of individual patents is over; gone are the days when the incentives, 
 
174 John Lippman, Gemstar, TV Guide Close Merger After Regulatory Delay, WALL ST. J., 
July 13, 2000, at C14.  Following the merger, the company changed its name to Gem-
star-TV Guide International Inc.  Id. 
175 See Fahey, supra note 173, at 52 (“[A] cadre of four of its biggest cable custom-
ers, sick of Gemstar’s near-monopoly, have developed a competing interactive guide 
that was painstakingly designed to avoid infringing Gemstar’s patent portfolio.”); Mar-
tin Peers, Hit or a Bad Rerun for Gemstar?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2004, at C1 (discussing 
how Yuen’s “aggressive tactic alienated companies he needed to deal with”). 
176 See, e.g., Erin Joyce, Gemstar Patent Woes Signal Shift in iTV Tech, 
ATNEWYORK.COM, June 25, 2002, http://www.atnewyork.com/news/article.php/ 
1371211 (quoting an analyst as saying Gemstar’s “mystique has been broken”); George 
Mannes, Falling Gemstar Can’t Catch a Break, THESTREET.COM, Sept. 3, 2002, 
http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/tech/georgemannes/10040293.html (quoting an 
analyst as saying it seems “the threat of the patents was more powerful than the patents 
itself [sic]”). 
177 Sallie Hofmeister, Gemstar Agrees to $10-Million Settlement, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 
2004, at C1. 
178 GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 9, available at http:// 
media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/11/111956/reports/annual03.pdf. 
179 See Peers, supra note 175, at C1 (describing differing views on Gemstar’s 
“comeback”). 
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strategies, and cost-benefit calculations of patents could be evaluated 
in isolation.  As we noted before, in the current patent system, the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts—and modern patent schol-
arship must reflect that understanding. 
This exhortation to utilize the patent portfolio theory is not 
merely due to theoretical considerations.  As we noted above, the 
portfolio theory offers substantial explanatory power—and foreshad-
ows a new generation of patent scholarship springing from its insights 
and empirical foundation.  In particular, we note the following major 
explanatory and descriptive implications of the patent portfolio the-
ory. 
1.  The Patent Paradox, Resolved 
As we noted in Part I, substantial recent attention has been turned 
to the dissonance between traditionalist theories of patent value and 
the current high rate of patenting, a situation conventionally de-
scribed as the patent paradox.180  To recap, the patent paradox asks why, 
if patents have little expected value, do large firms expend so many 
resources to obtain so many patents?181
The portfolio theory, as we have developed it throughout this Ar-
ticle, answers that question directly and straightforwardly:  firms pat-
ent heavily not to realize the value of individual patents, but to pur-
chase the advantages of the aggregation of these individual patents 
into patent portfolios.  The whole is greater than the sum of its parts:  
the benefits of patent portfolios in the modern innovation environ-
ment are, we suggest, so substantial as to explain the heretofore 
largely unexplained “value gap” at the heart of the patent paradox.182
Importantly, the patent portfolio theory established in this Article 
does not so much address the patent paradox as eliminate it.  That is, 
once one reconsiders the modern patenting environment through the 
explanatory lens of the patent portfolio theory, the bases for the long-
described patent paradox fall away.  In the modern portfolio-focused 
patenting system, there is no real question why firms patent at rates 
higher than conventionally expected:  they are simply behaving ra-
tionally, seeking patents whenever the marginal expected value of ex-
panding the portfolio outweighs the marginal cost of obtaining that 
additional patent.  That is, our analysis fully explains the high-volume 
180 See, e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 1, at 102 (explaining the patent paradox in 
the context of the semiconductor industry, where “the gap between the relative inef-
fectiveness of patents . . . and their widespread use is particularly striking”); see also su-
pra Part I.A. 
181 See supra Part I.A (discussing the patent paradox). 
182 See supra Part II.B (detailing the benefits of patent portfolios). 
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of patenting despite the fact that the average value of individual pat-
ents is very low. 
Indeed, one counterintuitive finding of the patent portfolio the-
ory is that the link between patenting intensity and the average value 
of individual patents is not merely attenuated, but likely to be inverse:  
as the average expected value of patents declines, a portfolio strategy 
will increase in salience, in turn leading to even greater patenting in-
tensity.  In other words, because the true value of patents lies in their 
aggregation (in large numbers), firms seeking patent protection are 
increasingly forced to do so via a high-quantity, portfolio-focused pat-
enting strategy.  This in turn implies an ever higher overall patenting 
intensity, even as the average expected value of individual patents 
falls. 
Accordingly, perhaps the primary implication of the patent port-
folio theory developed in this Article is the recognition that the recent 
“paradoxical” trends in patenting behavior are in fact simply predict-
able responses to the observable circumstances.  Indeed, the errant 
focus on individual patents led patent theorists astray, making them 
believe that the modern patent system was beset by an insoluble para-
dox.  Once the analytic focus shifts to the portfolio level, the paradox 
suddenly ceases to exist.  Collections of related patents generate con-
siderable advantages for patentees—advantages that go well beyond 
the aggregated value of each individual patent. Rational firms will 
seek to achieve the benefits of patent portfolios—and thus increase 
their patent intensity.  Paradox resolved.  For patent scholars, re-
searchers, and policymakers alike, this explanatory insight should 
yield far better understanding about the nature and function of the 
modern patenting system. 
2.  Explaining Patenting Patterns 
Another important aspect of the explanatory power of the patent 
portfolio theory is its illumination of the drivers of modern patenting 
patterns among firms.  In particular, we note that the portfolio theory 
fits nicely alongside the otherwise perplexing results of several recent 
empirical studies of patenting patterns. 
a.  Large Firms Patent More, Small Firms Patent More Carefully 
Statistical studies of patenting patterns have shown that while the 
vast share of patents are obtained by large, incumbent firms—which 
may, in some cases, patent at higher rates—small firms are likely to 
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patent proportionally more important innovations.183  This pattern 
poses something of a challenge to traditional theories, particularly the 
appropriability theory of patents.184  That is, because small firms lack 
many of the advantages of larger, incumbent players, these firms 
should be even more aggressive in seeking patent protection.185
Under the patent portfolio theory, this pattern is both explainable 
and expected.  In part this comes from recognizing the different pat-
183 On the relationship between firm size and quantity of patents, John Allison and 
Mark Lemley found that about 70% of issued patents were filed by large entities, while 
about 11% are filed by small businesses.  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Pat-
enting What?  An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 
(2000). 
 The relationship between firm size and the rates of patenting (e.g., per R&D dol-
lar) is more mixed.  On the one hand, an empirical study of patenting among firms in 
the chemical industry found that a 1% increase in firm size leads to a 0.3% increase in 
the patent rate.  Marvin B. Lieberman, Patents, Learning by Doing, and Market Structure in 
the Chemical Processing Industries, 5 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 257, 267 (1987).  Furthermore, 
Ariel Pakes has demonstrated that a stronger relationship between the quantity of 
R&D investment and the propensity to patent exists, where a 1% increase in the R&D 
expenditures yields a 1.56% increase in patenting.  Pakes, supra note 1, at 402.  On the 
other hand, Wesley Cohen and Steven Klepper report the general feeling among 
economists that the rate of patenting among firms actually decreased with firm size—
though they posit that such findings are at least partially reversed by evaluating the 
patent rate in terms of business unit rather than multi-product firms.  Wesley M. 
Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R&D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 930-31 (1996). 
 On the relationship between firm size and “quality” or “importance” of the pat-
ents, see, for example, F.M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism, 30 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1416, 1423 (1992) (discussing opposing viewpoints on the nature of the 
connection between firm size and patent quality); CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL 
INNOVATORS:  THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 11-12 (2003) 
(finding that small firms produce disproportionately high amounts of high-quality pat-
ents and innovation). 
184 As many in the economics literature have observed, these patterns—if you posit 
a relationship between real innovation and patenting rates—also challenge the 
Schumpeterian theory that large firms are more efficient and effective producers of 
innovation.  See Cohen & Klepper, supra note 183, at 930 (analyzing differences in in-
novation between large and small firms); see generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS 
CYCLES:  A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST 
PROCESS (1939) (comparing the advantages of large and small firms in technological 
innovation); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 
1950) (describing large firms’ advantages in innovation).  Note that this might be at 
least partially explained by the patent portfolio theory as well.  Once one relaxes the 
assumption that patent counts are a meaningful indicia of innovation (as opposed to a 
strategic goal exogenous to innovation) then it seems less surprising that large firms 
get less innovative bang for their patenting buck:  a portfolio-focused patenting ap-
proach is, as we noted in Part II, only loosely related to innovation at all. 
185 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1251, 1283 (2004) (“Aggressive litigation defense by small firms suggests that pat-
ents are of greater marginal value to these firms, especially considering the fact that 
litigation costs are more burdensome for a smaller firm with lower cash reserves and a 
weaker ability to raise external financing.”). 
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enting strategies available to large and small firms in the modern port-
folio-focused environment.  For large firms, a major driver of patent-
ing behavior is the need to create substantial patent portfolios—
independent of the expected values of any particular individual pat-
ents.  As we established in Part II.B, significant incentives operate to 
make a high quantity of patents within a technical field an overriding 
goal.  Small firms, however, are likely to be substantially more re-
source constrained, and thus will simply not be able to play the portfo-
lio game in any meaningful way.186  This limitation will have two pre-
dictable effects:  first, as we note below, it suggests that the modern 
patenting environment is adverse to small firms generally; and second, 
it implies that a firm that cannot engage in portfolio building is forced 
to revert to the (far) higher-risk strategy of selectively seeking “impor-
tant” patents within a technical field.  Because the information about 
which patents are commercially or technologically “important” is 
quite difficult to develop at an early stage of innovation, we view this 
approach as clearly dominated by the portfolio-directed strategy 
common among larger firms, though the facts seem to show that a se-
lective strategy is not entirely unsuccessful.187
That large and small firms experience the portfolio theory in dif-
ferent ways suggests, of course, that a transition point exists, a level at 
which once-small firms begin to shift resources from a “high-quality” 
to a “large-scale” patenting approach.  Indeed, it may well be that 
many small firms view their initial patenting efforts as merely building 
the foundation of future portfolio efforts.188  And, as the benefits of 
patent portfolios become more widely understood, and potentially 
more pronounced, this transition point should move in the direction 
of smaller, less-resourced firms—an observed pattern that already ex-
ists, as we note immediately below. 
186 We use the term “resource constrained” to primarily describe firms whose ex-
pectations of near-term resources for patenting are constrained; a firm that expects a 
dramatic increase in resources available for obtaining patents in the future would, we 
suggest, shift to a portfolio-building strategy for the reasons suggested in Part II. 
187 See Barnett, supra note 185, at 1288-89 (noting that small firms are responsible 
for a disproportionately high number of innovations).  Indeed, in his recent work on 
the impact of patents in the software industry, Professor Ronald Mann concludes that 
“[t]he effects of patents are much more likely to benefit small firms and contribute to 
industry fragmentation than to benefit large firms and contribute to industry concen-
tration.”  Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 961, 967-68 (2005). 
188 See Patel, supra note 116, at 1 (advocating that startup companies carefully 
build patent portfolios to accomplish “a variety of business objectives, such as bolster-
ing market position, protecting R&D efforts, generating revenue, and encouraging fa-
vorable cross-licensing or settlement agreements”); Braunschweig, supra note 99, at 24 
(noting the business goal of some young companies in the nanotechnology industries 
to build patent portfolios). 
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b.  An Increasing Share of Patents for Small Firms 
Throughout the 1990s, the share of all patents obtained by small 
firms and firms with relatively few prior patents increased, at the same 
time that the value of (individual) patents appears to have dimin-
ished.189  This, we think, is explained by the growing salience of the 
patent portfolio theory:  the “small firm” strategy we noted above 
(patenting relatively few, high-quality patents)190 is increasingly out-
paced by the large-firm portfolio-building approach.  As the patent 
system moves further and further in the direction of our portfolio 
theory, the expected result is that ever smaller firms will adopt the 
dominant strategy of building collections of large numbers of related 
patents, irrespective of individual worth.  In other words, as the patent 
system tilts to the advantage of large firms (i.e., those with large patent 
portfolios and the ability to build the same), successful small firms 
must engage the patent system as these large firms do.191
c.  Patterns of Patent Litigation 
The patent portfolio theory can also help illuminate the charac-
teristics of patent litigation that have emerged in several important re-
cent studies.  For example, while the rate of patent litigation (meas-
ured on a per-patent basis) does not appear to be rising overall,192 the 
rate of such litigation is rising among small firms and firms with 
smaller total patents.193  In other words, observable trends in patent 
189 See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2, at 31 (acknowledg-
ing that small and new firms account for a larger share of patents).  Note that because 
there was a concurrent increase in the amount of overall R&D conducted by both large 
and small firms, the trends related to patent intensity are unclear.  See id. at 28-35 (de-
scribing the general surge in patent activity). 
 On the diminished expectations of patent value, see supra Part I. 
190 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
191 As we note in Part IV.C below, whether this new environment eliminates or 
even meaningfully reduces the advantages of large firms is doubtful. 
192 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights:  
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 49/50 ANNALES D’ÉCONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 223, 
230 (1998) (stating that litigation rates were about 1% in the 1980s); Jean O. Lanjouw 
& Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation:  A Window on Competition, 32 
RAND J. ECON. 129, 131 (2001) (reporting the average litigation rate to be 1%). 
193 See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 192, at 147 (asserting that smaller 
firms are at a “high risk” of litigation); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, En-
forcement of Patent Rights in the United States, in PATENTS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY, supra note 1 [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Rights] (finding 
that individuals and small companies are “much more likely to be involved in suits”); 
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights 26 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8656, 2001) (“[S]mall companies are 
much more likely to be involved in suits.”). 
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litigation suggest that firms with large patent portfolios are signifi-
cantly less likely to litigate than smaller firms.194  This is, of course, an 
entirely expected result when you understand the patent system via 
patent portfolios:  as we noted in Part II.B, a major advantage con-
ferred upon portfolio holders is that litigation is less necessary to 
achieve marketplace ends.195  By contrast, firms lacking effective pat-
ent portfolios will find themselves increasingly unable to reach benefi-
cial accommodations with their more portfolio-rich competitors, and 
will be forced to the more costly, more prolonged, and higher risk 
strategy of patent litigation.196
B.  Through the Portfolio Prism: 
Understanding the Expanding Value of Patents 
In this Part, we revisit the patent theories we discussed in Part I 
and analyze how they should be recast in light of our portfolio ap-
proach.  We show that the portfolio theory provides a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the modern patent system and hence 
has the ability to unify seemingly divergent contributions to the patent 
literature. 
The portfolio approach has perhaps the farthest reaching implica-
tions for the “lottery” and “signaling” theories of patents.  Hence, we 
consider these theories first.  Recall that the lottery theory analogizes 
the inventive process to a giant lottery where patents are the equiva-
lent of lottery tickets.197  The lottery theory emphasizes the random-
ness that attends the inventive process and divides the universe of pat-
ents into a large set of “losers” (valueless patents) and a tiny set of 
“winners” (extremely valuable patents).  The portfolio approach offers 
a very different view of the patent system.  Our focus on aggregations 
of patents reveals that patents dramatically diverge from lotteries. 
First, our analysis shows that careful planning of a patent portfolio 
can substantially enhance a firm’s competitive position and positively 
affect its revenues.  The portfolio theory proves that there are rhyme 
194 See Lanjouw & Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 193, 
at 20 (explaining that “having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of 
being involved in a suit on any individual patent owned by the firm”). 
195 Again, this precise point has empirical support:  Lanjouw and Schankerman 
find that firms with portfolios that are large relative to a likely disputant’s portfolio are 
significantly less likely to use the courts.  Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Rights, supra 
note 193, at 148. 
196 Lanjouw and Schankerman also find that these smaller firms have no greater 
success rate in litigation, and thus face higher costs and greater delays in enforcing 
their (individual) patent rights, further confirming the portfolio theory’s intuition that 
the patent system disadvantages smaller (or less portfolio-savvy) firms.  Id. at 169-71. 
197 See supra Part I.B.3. 
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and reason to innovation—as opposed to pure randomness and 
chance.  In order to outperform the competition, firms cannot simply 
pursue any patent that comes their way and hope to get lucky.  Rather, 
firms must carefully plan their portfolio and pursue those patents that 
increase the overall value of their holdings. 
Second, the portfolio theory suggests that the pursuit of patents by 
corporations is not strictly driven by risk-seeking and excess optimism 
on the part of corporate managers, as the lottery theory assumes.  
Through the portfolio prism, the decisions of corporate managers ap-
pear both rational and even risk-averse.  The portfolio theory main-
tains that patents are not just lottery tickets that represent a small 
probability of winning a grand prize, but rather building blocks of 
commercial success.  Hence, a corporate policy that encourages pat-
enting may actually indicate managerial responsibility and careful 
planning. 
Third, our analysis implies that patenting policies are not nearly as 
one-dimensional as the lottery theory suggests.  Even patents that have 
no independent value can enhance the strength of a company’s port-
folio when combined with other patents.  Furthermore, unlike lottery 
tickets, patents can exhibit superadditivity.198  The value of a well-
designed portfolio will always exceed the sum of the values of the in-
dividual patents.  Thus, firms will seek to obtain a fairly wide range of 
patents, not just extremely valuable ones.  More specifically, firms will 
prefer to patent whenever the marginal contribution of a patent to 
the portfolio exceeds the cost of obtaining it. 
However, in other respects, the lottery theory and the portfolio 
theory are consistent and even reinforce one another.  For example, 
similar to the lottery theory, the portfolio theory recognizes the im-
portance of high-value patents.  Such patents anchor portfolios and 
an ideal portfolio must include some high-value patents.  Further-
more, the lottery theory and portfolio theory might be complemen-
tary in some cases.  A firm’s investment in R&D may be guided both 
by the desire to add marginal value to its portfolio and the hope for a 
windfall payoff.199
The portfolio theory has equally significant implications for the 
signaling theory.200  First, the portfolio theory reinstates the view that 
198 Superadditivity exists when f(x+y) > f(x) + f(y). 
199 A more appropriate metaphor, therefore, may be something akin to a Wonka 
candy bar:  worth the purchase price for the chocolate alone, but made even more de-
sirable by the possibility of finding an elusive Golden Ticket.  See ROALD DAHL, 
CHARLIE AND THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY 24 (1964) (describing that the five “Golden 
Tickets” had been hidden underneath ordinary wrapping paper of ordinary candy 
bars). 
200 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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the exclusivity conferred by patents is valuable; indeed, considerably 
more valuable than any signaling function patents perform.  As we 
have demonstrated, patent portfolios can generate substantial eco-
nomic rents for their holders and give patentees an important com-
petitive advantage.  Hence, the signaling theory captures only a sec-
ondary aspect of the role of patents. 
Second, insofar as signaling is concerned, the portfolio theory im-
plies that individual patents are not very useful signals.  To get an ac-
curate sense of a company’s position within a certain industry, third 
parties must examine the company’s patent portfolio as a whole.  Most 
of the individual patents that comprise a portfolio will prove to be of 
very little value when analyzed in isolation.  From a portfolio perspec-
tive, however, such patents may be quite valuable. 
And yet, the signaling theory and the portfolio theory are not mu-
tually exclusive.  The portfolio theory accepts the premise that portfo-
lios convey important information about firms.  Long was certainly 
correct to point out that patent portfolios—or patent counts, as she 
sometimes calls them—are able to convey relevant information about 
corporations.201  But in this regard, the portfolio theory offers two re-
finements to the signaling theory.  First, our theory suggests that the 
most important signal a portfolio conveys to potential investors and 
third parties is that the firm understands the modern business envi-
ronment and is competitive vis-à-vis other companies in the same in-
dustry.  Second, our analysis suggests that when reviewing a patent 
portfolio, third parties cannot simply count the patents.  Rather, they 
must consider the overall structure of the portfolio and pay close heed 
to the specific composition thereof.  In deciphering a portfolio signal, 
it is critical to determine (1) whether the individual patents comple-
ment one another so as to generate a superadditive effect, and (2) 
how well the portfolio hedges against risk and uncertainty.202
As for the defensive patenting theory,203 the portfolio theory com-
plements it in two important ways.  First, the portfolio theory demon-
strates that patents serve a myriad of non-defensive purposes.  Specifi-
cally, we have shown that patent portfolios facilitate in-house 
innovation, draw on related external inventions, enhance efforts to 
attract capital, and, in some cases, give voice in the politics of the pat-
ent system.  Second, our analysis pours concrete content into the de-
fensive patenting theory—in essence, by providing a theoretical blue-
print for maximizing the defensive effects of patents.  Our discussion 
in Part II elucidates how patents should be combined to effectively 
201 Long, supra note 1, at 646. 
202 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
203 See supra Part I.B.4. 
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protect the patentee.  To gain a strong defensive position, it is not 
enough to accumulate patents.  The portfolio theory instructs that, on 
the one hand, the individual patents in a portfolio must be inter-
related and concentrated in certain areas of research.  On the other 
hand, however, the portfolio theory cautions against over-
concentration of patents and generally advises patentees not to con-
fine their patenting efforts to one line of research or a single technol-
ogy. 
Finally, the portfolio theory gives new meaning to the internal-
metric theory.204  As it stands, the internal-metric theory contends that 
individual patents may be used to measure the productivity of R&D 
employees.  Although we maintain that this version only pertains to 
valuable individual patents, our analysis implies that patents may be 
used to measure the success rate of a research group as a whole.  If the 
R&D division succeeds in creating and maintaining a viable patent 
portfolio, it means that the division is performing well overall.  While 
individual patents are a problematic measure of individual productiv-
ity, viable portfolios provide an effective metric for assessing group 
performance. 
C.  Predictive Insights 
Viewing the modern patent system through the portfolio lens also 
offers meaningful insights into future trends in the innovation envi-
ronment.  In this Part, we note a few predictions about the future of 
the modern patent system in light of the patent portfolio theory. 
1.  Patent Intensity Will Remain High 
Perhaps the most important prediction enabled by the portfolio 
theory is that the current patent intensity (patents obtained per re-
search dollar) should not be expected to drop dramatically—at least 
absent the intervention of other major factors, such as substantive le-
gal changes.  Given the advantages of patent portfolios,205 we expect 
that modern, innovation-driven firms will increasingly view patent 
portfolios as essential to their long-term success, and behave accord-
ingly.  We expect that firms will continue to maximize the number of 
patents per R&D dollar.206
204 See supra Part II.B.2. 
205 See supra Part II.B. 
206 See supra Part II.C (discussing why firms will choose to seek a large quantity of 
patents). 
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2.  Pressure on the PTO Will Increase 
Lately there has been a growing concern with the quality of review 
of patent applications by the PTO.  Scholars who have studied the 
PTO have pointed out that the poor review process is due, at least in 
part, to insufficient resources.207  The PTO is both underfunded and 
understaffed.  The recent increase in the number of filings has 
stretched the PTO to its limit, and perhaps beyond.  On average, pat-
ent examiners spend only eighteen hours on each application they re-
view.  Furthermore, the reward structure of patent examiners gives 
them an incentive to approve the applications they review.208
The portfolio theory implies that, barring a major reform in the 
PTO, the quality of review will remain poor for the foreseeable future.  
Our analysis suggests that the number of filings will remain high.  This 
means that the pressure on patent examiners is not going to ease and 
that the quality of review is unlikely to improve.  True, patent examin-
ers could, in theory, spend more time on each application.  But, if the 
number of examiners is to remain constant, a more careful review 
process will worsen the backlog in the PTO.  According to some re-
ports, even at the current rate of review the wait time between filing 
and a decision may soon top five years.209  Slowing down the review 
process in order to improve the quality will almost surely necessitate a 
much longer wait.  More importantly, since approving applications in-
creases the examiner’s reward, it cannot be seriously expected that 
patent examiners will initiate a more exacting review of patent appli-
cations.  Hence, without external intervention, the quality of the re-
view process will not improve.210
207 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 75, at 603-05 (noting the lack of adequate resources 
at the PTO and suggesting that the PTO use more of its time evaluating patents that 
have high potential future value). 
208 See id. at 609 (“The current bonus system is believed to skew incentives in favor 
of granting patents.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent Sys-
tem:  A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (observing that pat-
ent examiners get credit for “disposal” only when the application is allowed or aban-
doned, not when it is repeatedly rejected). 
209 John W. Schoen, U.S. Patent Office Swamped by Backlog, Apr. 27, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). 
210 See infra Part IV.C.7 (discussing the implications of this prediction). 
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3.  Patent “Thickets”211 Will Continue to Grow 
The patent portfolio theory also predicts that certain components 
of the cost of innovation will increase in the future.  As we explained 
above, to achieve an effective portfolio, firms must obtain a significant 
number of related patents.212  The concentration of related patents in 
the hands of certain firms will raise the information and transaction 
costs associated with innovation.  In a portfolio-driven environment, 
innovators will be forced to spend more time acquiring information 
about preexisting patents213 and negotiating licenses with their hold-
ers.  As several commentators have pointed out, in such a patent-
intensive environment, one should also expect occasional holdup 
problems and bargaining failures.214  As a result, innovation becomes 
more costly, at least for firms that do not have strong patent portfolios 
of their own.215
The portfolio theory not only explains the existence of “patent 
thickets,” but also suggests that the problem is highly unlikely to go 
away.  As we have shown, a strong patent portfolio yields substantial 
benefits to its holder.  Hence, profit-maximizing firms will continue to 
211 “Patent thickets” refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great num-
bers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability 
to any commercial product.  See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:  Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 
119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (explaining that a “patent thicket” occurs 
when many patents apply to a single product); James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic 
Patenting of Complex Technologies (2004) (working paper, on file with authors) (same). 
212 See supra Part II. 
213 On the sources of information costs, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent 
and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 474-82 (2004). 
214 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998) (suggesting that a “pro-
liferation of patents on individual [gene] fragments” will lead to the underuse of re-
search materials and the inhibition of research); Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of 
Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 465 (1995) (demonstrating that the threat of litigation 
deters smaller firms from entering areas of research where larger firms hold patents); 
Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:  The Role of 
Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 831-38 (2001) (exploring anti-
competitive problems related to patents); Shapiro, supra note 211, at 124-26 (discuss-
ing the holdup problem). 
 Notwithstanding the growing academic concerns about the adverse effect of in-
tense patenting on innovation, the only empirical study to date found a surprisingly 
small number of holdups in innovation.  See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 25 (“Firms 
do not, however, build such patent fences because individual patents effectively pre-
vent imitation or substitution, but because they do not.”).  Of course, this does not 
mean that bargaining costs have not since risen as a result of the higher number of 
patents. 
215 See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing in detail the impact of the portfolio theory on 
small firms). 
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accumulate related patents and ignore the costs that their actions im-
pose on other innovators.  Furthermore, no individual firm, acting 
alone, can change this dynamic.  Accordingly, the portfolio theory 
confirms academic concerns about the increased cost of innovation 
and implies that the problem of patent thickets will not go away.216
4.  Patent Litigation Will Become More Complex and Costly 
Another important prediction we can make using the patent port-
folio theory is that patent litigation will become more complex in the 
future.  Our analysis underscores the importance of scale in portfolio 
construction.  As corporations amass sizeable yet concentrated portfo-
lios, it becomes ever more likely that infringement suits will involve 
increasingly large numbers of patents.  One result of the interrelated-
ness of the individual patents in a portfolio is that a product or tech-
nology that infringes one patent is likely to infringe others.  Similarly, 
because portfolios are designed with defensive purposes in mind, it is 
quite likely that, in cases that go to litigation, defendants will counter-
claim by alleging infringements by the plaintiff. 
Note, though, that we do not argue that there will necessarily be 
an increase in the number of litigated cases; only that the cases that go 
to court will become more complex.  The effect of patent portfolios 
on the number of litigated cases is difficult to determine and we do 
not feel that we can make accurate predictions about it.  The portfolio 
theory can have several effects on the number of litigated cases.  One 
may intuit that the rise in the number of portfolios will lead to more 
litigation.  Recall, however, that our analysis suggests that patent port-
folios may actually serve to keep potential litigants at bay.217  Small 
companies and new entrants who are threatened with an infringe-
ment suit may choose to avoid the cost of litigation and settle outside 
of the court.218  As between large companies, they too may prefer not 
to engage in a battle of the titans with a competitor and may instead 
216 But see Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for 
Pharmaceutical Patents:  Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 3 (Univ. of Chicago Law 
School, Olin Working Paper No. 209, 2004), available at http://www.law.uchicago. 
edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/209.rae-bk.anticommons.pdf (arguing that recent 
academic concerns are overstated). 
217 See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
218 Patent litigation is notoriously expensive, and also has the potential to drag on 
for years.  See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 214, at 470-71 (discussing the costs of patent liti-
gation); Manny D. Pokotilow, Why Alternative Dispute Resolution Should Be Used for Intellec-
tual Property Disputes, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2004, at 17, 17 (noting that “it is 
rare for a patent infringement action to cost less than $1 million for each party by the 
time it is ultimately resolved” and emphasizing that a case could potentially stretch on 
for decades).  On the costs of litigation generally, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of 
Law:  How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
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reach a mutually beneficial licensing deal.  Indeed, our prediction 
about the increased complexity of patent litigation implies that the 
cost of future litigation will also be higher.  The high cost of litigation 
could discourage even large companies from litigating.  Hence, we 
cannot say in the abstract whether the number of cases that reach a 
decision will increase or decrease, and we leave this question to future 
empirical research. 
5.  Mass-Licensing Arrangements Will Proliferate 
The portfolio theory also suggests that mass licensing of patents 
will become more common in the future.  Due to the interrelatedness 
of the individual patents within a portfolio, securing a license for a 
single patent may not adequately protect the licensee from future liti-
gation.  Also, the uncertainty that attends the inventive process makes 
it very difficult for licensees in the early stages of research to isolate a 
single patent or two that they must license to clear the way for their 
own work. 
In a portfolio-driven environment, mass licensing has two key ad-
vantages over individual licensing.  The first advantage, which we have 
already explained, pertains to risk:  mass-licensing diminishes expo-
sure to lawsuits.  The second, and perhaps more significant advantage, 
relates to transaction costs.  Mass-licensing effects a transaction cost 
reduction relative to individual licensing.  Rather than engaging in 
numerous license negotiations, each involving a single patent, it 
makes more sense for companies to economize on transaction costs by 
negotiating a single license over multiple patents.219  In extreme cases, 
licensees may even find it in their best interest to license entire portfo-
lios.  Doing so can save them the costs of carefully studying each indi-
vidual patent in the portfolio and allows them to use all the patents 
they might need after completing a single transaction. 
Of course, the attractiveness of mass-licensing will vary in individ-
ual cases.  Some licensees may find mass-licensing unappealing as it 
raises the fee they have to pay the licensor.  We do not predict, how-
ever, that mass licensing will always dominate individual licensing in 
the future.  Rather, we argue that in a portfolio-driven business envi-
ronment, mass licensing will be a common phenomenon. 
219 See Grindley & Teece, supra note 114, at 9 (explaining that the “portfolio ap-
proach reduces transaction costs”). 
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6.  The Patent System Will Increasingly Favor Large, 
Well-Funded, Incumbent Players 
The portfolio theory also enables us to make a key distributional 
prediction.  Our analysis indicates that holders of strong patent port-
folios have an inherent advantage over competitors that hold a small 
number of individual patents.  If portfolio strength is positively corre-
lated with firm size, then one should expect that large firms will play a 
dominant role in shaping the future of innovation.  Furthermore, our 
analysis implies that entry into a patent-based industry is more difficult 
than is currently assumed.  In the paradigmatic case, new companies 
that seek to enter a certain industry will have relatively few patents, 
which in turn will make it very difficult for them to compete with in-
cumbents.  Not only are new entrants more vulnerable to the threat of 
litigation, but they also face a higher cost structure for producing ad-
ditional innovation.  As we have explained, a strong portfolio both 
lowers the cost of subsequent in-house innovation220 and helps attract 
related external innovation.221  New entrants have fewer patents to rely 
on in producing future innovation.  Also, new entrants with a small 
number of patents cannot as easily engage in cross-licensing—the 
most cost-effective method of mass-licensing.222
The competitive advantage portfolios bestow upon incumbents, 
and possibly large firms, may also have important welfare implications.  
Several studies have suggested that small firms and new entrants tend 
to produce more socially valuable innovation.223  These studies are 
subject to debate.  But if they prove correct, they give rise to a concern 
that patent portfolios actually dilute the quality of innovation.  Re-
gardless, the inherent advantage that portfolios bestow on incumbents 
clearly has antitrust implications.224
220 See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
221 See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
222 See generally Shapiro, supra note 211, at 130 (arguing that cross-licensing permits 
more effective innovation). 
223 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 185, at 1285-88 (“Small firms and other entrants 
carry out a disproportionate share of entrepreneurial research.”); Wesley M. Cohen & 
Steven Klepper, Firm Size Versus Diversity in Achievement of Technological Advance, in 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 183-203 
(Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds., 1991) (describing how small firms may be 
better situated to “stimulate creativity and agility in response to economic opportu-
nity”); Richard J. Rosen, Research and Development with Asymmetric Firm Sizes, 22 RAND J. 
ECON. 411, 419-21 (1991) (finding that small firms have a greater incentive to create 
revolutionary technologies). 
224 See infra Part V.C. 
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7.  The Value of Individual Patents Will Become More Obscure 
(and Increasingly Irrelevant) 
Finally, we would like to note the effect of our portfolio theory on 
individual patents.  As patent portfolios become more prevalent, it will 
be increasingly difficult to assess accurately the stand-alone value of 
individual patents.  Two effects are liable to produce this result.  First, 
a key teaching of the portfolio theory is that patents should be exam-
ined at the portfolio level.  Specifically, the theory demonstrates that 
the value of individual patents may be enhanced by related patents in 
the same portfolio.  Hence, we expect that, in the future, analysts and 
investors will focus more on portfolios and less on individual patents. 
Second, as we have explained, inventors’ desire to attain a robust 
patent portfolio means that the rate of filings will remain high in the 
future, and the quality of the PTO’s review will remain low.  The low-
quality of review means that a significant number of the patents ap-
proved by the PTO may in fact be invalid.  Consequently, third parties 
will have to discount the value of issued patents.  We emphasize that 
the low quality of review will also make it difficult to calculate portfo-
lio values.  Yet, in many cases, the invalidation of one of the patents in 
a portfolio might not have a dramatic effect on the overall value of the 
portfolio. 
V.  POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE PATENT PORTFOLIOS ERA 
In light of the array of predictions noted above, the rise of patent 
portfolios portends—in our view—a more costly patent system:  one 
with far more patents of often-irrelevant individuated value, higher 
transaction costs, and a continued sidelining of the PTO’s role in 
screening for quality inventions.  Further, if (as we think is likely) the 
rise of patent portfolios increases the net costs of innovation—by forc-
ing firm R&D efforts to increasingly adjust and account for the patent-
ing behavior of other firms, or by simply increasing the input costs of 
crucial (patented) information—then the net effects of patent portfo-
lios on innovation may well be negative.  But perhaps most impor-
tantly, the competition-related effects of patent portfolios may be dif-
ficult to overstate.  As firms increasingly use portfolios as ever more 
effective tools for the domination of innovation markets, the results 
would seem to be (1) a broad consolidation and centralization of in-
ventive activity within large firms or groups of firms organized around 
jointly developed patent portfolios,225 and (2) the use of portfolios to 
225 Of course, the classic Schumpeterian view is that this trend might be beneficial 
to the rate of innovation.  See generally SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 184 (describing this view).  And yet many economists have 
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achieve real market power or otherwise cartelize markets.226  Given 
this understanding—that patent portfolios have substantial and at 
least potentially quite negative effects—we now turn to the question of 
adjusting policy for a portfolio-based era. 
A.  The Direct Regulation of Patent Portfolios 
A first set of policy options includes a range of efforts to directly 
regulate the growth and deployment of patent portfolios. 
1.  Patent Holding Caps 
A trivially simple example would be a limit or “cap” on the total 
patent holdings available to any single firm.  Such caps could be im-
plemented either on a yearly basis (which would restrict the growth 
over time of portfolios) or calculated as a grand total.  The actual lim-
its might be determined in a variety of ways:  across-the-board (i.e., the 
same cap for all firms); calculated as a percentage of firm size (for ex-
ample, as a fraction of gross revenues or R&D outlays); or based on 
prior-year numbers (such as the average yearly increase in holdings). 
The advantages of holdings caps are their relative simplicty and 
likelihood of at least some effectiveness in limiting firms’ ability to 
create significant patent portfolios.  The disadvantages, however, are 
important.  For one thing, a simple cap system would almost certainly 
preclude consideration of important innovation-related factors, such 
as industry, technology, firm R&D efficiency, and more.227  Another 
found the opposite to be true:  that small firms seem to be more efficient vehicles for 
innovation.  See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 185, at 1288-89 (“[S]mall firms tend both to 
be more efficient innovators (as measured by the number of innovations per dollar of 
R&D or per employee) and to account for a disproportionate share of innovations (es-
pecially, significant innovations) in many industries.”).  Our point here is that, irre-
spective of the innovation-rate effects, the diminution of competition in the market for 
new innovations is likely to have negative consequences. 
226 As has been often observed, patents and other intellectual property rights 
rarely, if ever, confer monopoly-like market power.  See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Informa-
tion Wants to Be Free:  Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 995, 1013-15 (2003) (describing the market forces that limit the monopoly effects 
of intellectual property rights); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors 
in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730-31 (2000) 
(discussing the relative rarity of patents that confer an economic monopoly); Edmund 
W. Kitch, Patents:  Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31, 31 (1986) (assert-
ing that a patent “confers a property right which . . . is subject to competitive market 
pressures”).  Patent portfolios, of course, may change that understanding.  See supra 
Part II.B. 
227 One could, of course, imagine a portfolio caps system that attempted to in-
clude such information.  For example, the capping scheme could be tailored for an 
industry or technological area.  Or the determination of caps could be weighted in fa-
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problem is that administration of such a system might be more diffi-
cult than it initially appears:  firms could alter corporate structures, 
form new entities, or otherwise seek to evade firm-based limits on pat-
enting.  But perhaps the biggest concern with caps is their potential 
distorting effect on innovation.  By limiting patenting by firms on a 
non-invention basis, a portfolio caps scheme could (if caps were set 
too low) significantly reduce incentives to invent, or drive more inven-
tion protection towards trade secrecy.228  Indeed, because holding 
caps are triggered by factors that are unrelated to any particular in-
vention, the limits will operate to exclude both high-quality (more de-
sirable) and low-quality patents.  Consequently, in some cases their 
operation will be perverse, inasmuch as they fully allow (as long as the 
caps are not reached) the sort of low-quality patenting that is a hall-
mark of the modern patent portfolio era. 
For these reasons, we are not convinced that portfolio caps, by 
themselves, are an appropriate solution at this point. 
2.  Differential Fees 
A related, albeit less rigid, approach to controlling patent portfo-
lios is to implement a fee structure for the patent system that incorpo-
rates information about firm patent holdings.  For example, the stan-
dard filing fee for patent applications could be subject to a multiplier, 
where the multiplier is related to the firm’s current patent holdings.229  
Firms with larger holdings would face higher fees, thereby providing 
some disincentive to adopt a high-volume, low-quality patenting strat-
egy.  A similar approach could also be adopted with respect to main-
tenance fees:  the cost of extending the life of a patent could be re-
lated to firms’ patent holdings—again, with major patent holders 
paying more. 
As with patent holding caps, a differential fees system would ap-
pear to be at least reasonably likely to have an effect on the incentives 
for firms to seek patent portfolios.  But many of the same problems 
are present here as well:  the effects might be evaded by manipulation 
of corporate structures; the scheme might distort the pace of innova-
tion in unexpected ways; and it could operate to limit the filing of 
both high-quality and low-quality patent applications.  And even the 
vor of smaller firms (allowing them more patents).  Unfortunately, as more complexity 
is added to the system, a chief advantage of the system—its simplicity—is lost, and the 
potential costs of error are likely to increase, not decrease. 
228 Note that if caps are set too high, the system will be ineffective for its intended 
purpose. 
229 Obviously, the various metrics related to patent holding discussed in connec-
tion with patent holding caps could be utilized here as well. 
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chief advantage of a differential fee system—the flexibility inherent in 
a system of fees rather than absolute limits on patent filings—is an 
important disadvantage, because without good information about the 
demand elasticity of patent filings, it will be difficult to determine the 
appropriate fee levels.  For example, consider that the current base-
level patent filing fee for most firms is $300,230 while even a low-cost 
patent prosecution can easily cost over $10,000 in attorney’s fees.231  
This suggests that significant alterations to the incentives to file patent 
applications would only be realized with very substantial changes (of 
perhaps orders of magnitude) in the fee structure.232
As with the patent holding caps noted above, we are concerned 
that the effectiveness of differential fees, by themselves, would be too 
uncertain to justify the potential problems, although they are worth 
further consideration and study—especially as a part of an array of 
policy solutions. 
B.  Addressing Portfolio Strategies Ex Ante 
A second important—and potentially very effective—policy ap-
proach is to tailor the legal regime of the patent law to generate ex 
ante incentives (those prior to or during patent prosecution) that un-
dermine firms’ interests in pursuing a high-volume, low-quality patent-
ing strategy.  This approach was outlined by one of the authors in Re-
considering Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 
wherein the venerable doctrine of “prosecution history estoppel” was 
explained as an important mechanism for forcing patentees to pro-
duce sufficient information about their patented invention at an early 
stage.233  Indeed, the problem of patent portfolios, where large num-
bers of low-quality patents are obtained with little regard to their valid-
ity or actual value, is an especially compelling consequence of what 
one of the authors has described as the “prosecution externality”:  the 
230 USPTO FY 2005 Fee Schedule (Oct. 1, 2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2005oct01.htm.  “Small entities”—generally individual inven-
tors, non-profits, and very small businesses—qualify for a 50% discount on fees.  Id. 
231 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1498. 
232 We note that the PTO’s 2005 Fee Structure does implement a form of fee-
differentiation, albeit on the basis of application complexity and length rather than 
any firm-based measures.  For example, the new fee structure has sharply escalating 
charges for numbers of claims and total sheets of the specification and drawings.  
USPTO FY 2005 Fee Schedule, supra note 230. 
233 See generally Wagner, supra note 34, at 169-71.  Prosecution history estoppel is a 
rule which serves to prevent a patentee from relinquishing subject matter coverage 
during patent prosecution and later claiming—via the doctrine of equivalents—
coverage of such subject matter during an enforcement proceeding.  See, e.g., Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-35 (2002) (describ-
ing the doctrine). 
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ability of patentees to avoid most of the costs of uncertain, poorly 
drafted, and incompletely disclosed patents.234  That patentees have 
insufficient incentives to seek only high-quality patents (and fully dis-
close them) is surely a major driver of the growth of patent port- 
folios we identify in this Article.235
In the portfolio context, there are several possibilities for adjust-
ments to legal rules that should yield better ex ante incentives.  First, 
as discussed in Reconsidering Estoppel, by reducing patent scope for 
those patents that are drawn too broadly in their initial application 
(i.e., “overclaimed”), a robust doctrine of prosecution history estoppel 
would be valuable.236  Similarly, Joe Miller has followed this approach 
in calling for a series of rules for patentees to disclose additional in-
formation (such as preferred definitions of key terms) that would be 
very helpful for claim construction.237  Additionally, the ex ante effects 
of patent doctrines such as the “dedication” rule,238 the “first-to-
invent” rule,239 and the “written description” requirement240 have not 
been fully explored, but all present significant opportunities to im-
plement a legal regime that forces more information from patentees 
at an earlier stage. 
The value of such information-forcing rules in patent law is multi-
faceted, and could be especially important in this context.  First, and 
most obviously, by generating incentives to more fully disclose, define, 
234 Wagner, supra note 34, at 222-25. 
235 See supra Part II (documenting the rise of patent portfolios). 
236 Wagner, supra note 34, at 164-67. 
237 Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177 (2005).  
238 The dedication rule specifies that subject matter that is disclosed in a patent 
document, but not claimed in the claims, is “dedicated to the public” and thus un-
available to the patentee during an enforcement proceeding.  See Johnson & Johnston 
Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(noting the existence of the rule). 
239 The first-to-invent rule (a virtually unique feature of the U.S. patent system) 
assigns patent rights to the first inventor to conceive of an invention, rather than the 
first inventor to apply for a patent on the invention.  35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). 
240 The written description requirement limits patentees to claiming only those 
portions of their inventions that they demonstrate (via their written disclosures) they 
actually possessed at the time of patent filing.  See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir.) (discussing the written description re-
quirement), reh’g en banc denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 629 
(2004); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(same); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(same); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (same); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same); In re Goodman, 
11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same); Fiers v. Rivel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (same); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (same). 
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articulate, and tailor one’s invention, an ex ante approach will neces-
sarily yield higher quality patents that are easier for all parties (the 
PTO, competitors, and even the patentee) to fully evaluate.241  Sec-
ond, an ex ante approach will raise the costs of prosecuting low-value 
patents in particular, because the generation of additional informa-
tion will serve to further weaken (and obviously so) such patents.  
Third, an ex ante approach will raise the costs of patent acquisition 
generally (though the penalty will fall more heavily on low-quality pat-
ents), which will force firms to allocate patenting resources differ-
ently.  Fourth, an ex ante approach will enhance the PTO’s screening 
functions, forcing patentees to more seriously engage with the PTO at 
an early stage of the patenting process.242  These factors, taken to-
gether, suggest that a serious implementation of an ex ante approach 
to the patent law could provide important disincentives to pursue a 
high-volume, low-quality patenting strategy—and accordingly could 
limit the attractiveness of building significant patent portfolios. 
C.  Tailoring Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law constitutes another mechanism that may be em-
ployed to curb the potential anticompetitive effects of patent portfo-
lios and level the playing field for small firms.  The inherent tension 
between patent law and antitrust law is a well-known problem that has 
spawned an extensive body of scholarship.  As Louis Kaplow wrote two 
decades ago:  “The intersection of antitrust law and patent policy has 
proved to be a source of perpetual confusion and controversy since 
the passage of the Sherman Act nearly a century ago.”243  Patent law 
aims to promote innovation by bestowing upon inventors a broad 
power to exclude; antitrust law aspires to enhance competition by 
striking down exclusionary practices. 
While antitrust scholars invested considerable efforts in devising 
creative schemes to reconcile the patent and antitrust laws,244 courts 
often sidestepped the patent-antitrust conundrum by postulating that 
as long as patentees act within the scope of a patent, they will gener-
241 See Wagner, supra note 34, at 212-14 (discussing the advantages to all parties of 
more complete information in the patent process). 
242 See id. at 225-28 (exploring the effect of prosecution history estoppel on the 
effectiveness of the PTO’s administration function). 
243 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1815 (1984). 
244 For a comprehensive discussion of the various theoretic proposals, see Michael 
A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 787-99 (2002). 
72 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1 
 
ally be exempt from antitrust liability.245  For example, in In re Inde-
pendent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, the Federal Circuit 
stated that “[i]n the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent 
holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the 
antitrust laws.”246  As Michael Carrier correctly pointed out, this ap-
proach promotes “clarity for . . . inventors, and future courts and law-
yers, [but only at the cost of] deferring excessively to the pat-
ent . . . .”247
The prevailing judicial view presumably relies on the correct as-
sumption that individual patents rarely confer significant market 
power.248  The aggregation of individual patents into portfolios poses 
several new challenges.  As we pointed out, portfolios are essentially 
super-patents whose coverage extends far beyond that of any of the 
individual patents comprising them.  More importantly, portfolio 
holders can affect their rivals in ways individual patent holders cannot. 
In a recent article, Daniel Rubinfeld and Robert Maness discuss 
the various ways by which portfolio holders can raise rivals’ costs.249  
First, large portfolio holders can engage rivals in complex litigation, 
forcing them to incur substantial costs and undermining their ability 
to market competing products.250  Furthermore, because the portfolio 
holder controls the litigation process, the holder can choose to assert 
patent claims that are cheaper to prosecute than to defend.  Second, 
portfolio holders may use the threat of litigation to force rivals to buy 
package licenses that cover patents that the rivals neither need nor 
245 See, e.g., id. at 788 (“The courts’ most popular solution to the patent-antitrust 
conflict is centered on the ‘scope’ of the patent.  Throughout the past century and 
even now, courts have held that a patentee’s actions within the scope of the patent are 
immune from antitrust scrutiny, while those outside the scope are invalid.”). 
246 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 
F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e hold that where a patent has been lawfully ac-
quired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot trigger any li-
ability under the antitrust laws.”). 
247 Carrier, supra note 244, at 778. 
248 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 
177-78 (1965) (finding that, without a clear definition of the relevant market, it was 
impossible to say that the patent at issue conferred any power over the market); Am. 
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (observing 
that “patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of that word”). 
249 Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents:  Implications for 
Antitrust 5-7, http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/cerna_regulation/Documents/Colloque 
Antitrust2004/Rubinfeld-Presentation.pdf (2004). 
250 See id. at 5 (noting that a firm can raise rivals’ costs by filing or threatening to 
file patent suits). 
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want.251  This strategy is especially beneficial to portfolio holders if the 
royalties are purely based on the number of patents in the package.252
While raising rivals’ costs improves the lot of portfolio holders by 
enabling them to gain market share, and in extreme cases drives 
competitors out of the market, it adversely affects price competition.253  
The higher costs incurred by competitors limit their ability to lower 
prices, and lessen the resources they can invest in R&D.  Hence, rais-
ing rivals’ costs has negative effects on both static and dynamic effi-
ciency. 
Worse yet, Rubenfeld and Maness also argue that a strategy of rais-
ing rivals’ costs may serve as a collusion facilitating device.254  Rather 
than contesting the cost increase due to package licensing, each port-
folio holder can agree to pay the required royalties and raise its own 
prices.  This way, all portfolio holders could collect supra-competitive 
rents.255
Finally, Rubenfeld and Maness suggest that the thicket effects ac-
companying many patent portfolios256 make it easier for the portfolio 
holder to extract concessions from rivals either by threatening litiga-
tion or by engaging in package licensing.  Specifically, the uncertainty 
created by patent thickets increases information costs for rivals, mak-
ing it riskier and more expensive to try to design around patents. 
Yet, at the end of the day, Rubenfeld and Maness do not call for a 
per se prohibition on package licensing.  This is no accident.  Consis-
tent with the view expressed by other scholars,257 Rubenfeld and 
Maness acknowledge that package licensing may have procompetitive 
effects in some circumstances.  Indeed, the Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property provide that cross-licensing and 
pooling arrangements “may provide procompetitive benefits by inte-
grating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, 
251 Id. 
252 See id. at 10 (“Per-unit royalties raise marginal costs, and can lead to higher 
product prices.”). 
253 Id. at 6. 
254 Id. 
255 See id. at 11-17 (outlining, in a case study, the use of package licensing). 
256 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
257 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1319 (1996) (highlight-
ing the potential of patent pools to lower transaction costs by facilitating “licensing and 
royalty splitting, and also extensive cross-licensing among members”) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
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clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litiga-
tion.”258
Accordingly, a determination of the net effect of package licens-
ing and pooling arrangements on competition requires a careful 
analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of these practices.  It is 
quite possible that the outcome of the analysis would vary from one 
industry to another.  For example, Michael Carrier proposed that 
“cross-licenses and patent pools are reasonably necessary to circum-
vent bottlenecks in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries,” 
as long as such arrangement targets “thickets of blocking patents.”259  
As we noted, cross-licensing and patent pools will often benefit domi-
nant industry participants at the expense of smaller rivals.  Hence, an 
industry-by-industry analysis would require the courts and the antitrust 
authorities to assess the relative contributions of large and small com-
panies to the relevant industry or technological sector.  Given limited 
resources and highly imperfect information, it may be unrealistic to 
expect the courts and the antitrust authorities to successfully perform 
this examination. Since antitrust intervention is costly and its effec-
tiveness in curbing the anticompetitive effects is questionable, such 
intervention should be used sparsely. 
D.  Letting the Market Sort It Out 
In light of the limited ability of the antitrust laws to provide an 
adequate response to the challenges presented by patent portfolios, it 
seems inevitable that the market will play a large part in shaping the 
path of future innovation.  While our analysis suggests that patent 
portfolios give large companies an inherent advantage over smaller 
competitors, it does not imply that small and startup companies will 
disappear from the scene.  Small companies will continue to innovate 
and thrive even in a portfolio-dominated environment for two princi-
pal reasons.  First, small companies can “fill in” gaps in the portfolios 
of large companies by coming up with innovations that complement 
their larger rivals’ portfolios.260  Second, small companies can outper-
form their more established rivals by focusing their inventive efforts 
on disruptive technologies. 
In a recent book, Clayton Christensen demonstrates the vulner-
ability of established and well-managed firms to disruptive technolo-
258 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
0558.pdf. 
259 Michael A. Carrier, The Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1105 (2003). 
260 Thanks to Rob Merges for suggesting this approach to us. 
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gies.261  According to Christensen, leading firms are well suited to 
dealing with sustaining technologies: innovations that “improve the 
performance of established products.”262  But they are ill-equipped to 
handle disruptive “technologies that result in worse product perform-
ance, at least in the near-term.”263  Disruptive technologies start as 
cheaper, lower performance alternatives to established technologies.  
They typically gain a foothold in the low end of the market and, 
because they do not appeal to the high margin customers market, 
incumbents initially tend to disregard them.  Gradually, however, 
disruptive technologies improve, without a large increase in cost, until 
they rival and ultimately replace established technologies. 
Among other examples, Christensen uses the evolution of 
computer technology to substantiate his theory.  According to 
Christensen, “IBM, the industry’s first leader,” and its competitors, 
failed to respond to the emergence of the minicomputer.  Since 
“[t]heir customers had no use for it” and “it promised lower, not 
higher, margins,” mainframe makers “ignored the minicomputer for 
years, allowing a set of [new] entrants—Digital Equipment, Data 
General, Prime, Wang, and Nixdorf—to create and dominate that 
market.”264  Minicomputer manufacturers enjoyed a period of 
prosperity that ended abruptly when a new disruptive technology, the 
desktop personal computer (PC), was introduced by another “set of 
entrants, including Apple, Commodore, Tandy, and IBM.”265  The 
dominance of the latter group was disrupted, in turn, by the 
introduction of the portable computer by entrants “like Toshiba, 
Sharp, and Zenith.”266
Christensen’s account of disruptive technology suggests that there 
will always be a niche for small innovators in technological markets.  It 
also suggests that disruptive technologies provide some sort of a safe 
haven for small innovators.  This means that despite the advantages 
presented by patent portfolios, small innovators will not be driven out 
of the market entirely.  Instead, in a portfolio-dominated 
environment, one should expect to see small firms either cooperating 
with large portfolio holders by complementing their portfolios or 
competing with them by focusing on disruptive technologies. 
 
*       *      * 
261 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 36. 
262 Id. at xv.  Christensen notes that “rarely have even the most radically difficult 
sustaining technologies precipitated the failure of leading firms.”  Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 108-09. 
265 Id. at 109. 
266 Id. 
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That we think the net effect of patent portfolios is likely to be 
negative does not mean, however, that they have no redeeming quali-
ties whatsoever.  Indeed, under some circumstances, the rise of patent 
portfolios might have beneficial effects, such as the following: 
Additional disclosure.  Because each patent contains an “enabling” 
disclosure of the relevant invention, the dramatic growth in issued 
patents should represent a corresponding growth in useful, innova-
tion-related disclosure, thereby building the total quantity of available 
information.267  This might be particularly important coupled with the 
recently decreased time delay between patent application filing and 
publication,268 meaning that more information in patent documents 
will be available sooner.  Unfortunately, this benefit will be offset to 
some degree by the decline in the average value of individual pat-
ents—meaning that the marginal additional value of the information 
in patents will decline.269
Encouraging Broad(er) Research Efforts.  Because of the advantages of 
diversity as well as scale noted in Part II.B, portfolio-savvy firms are 
likely to have additional incentives to broaden, albeit slightly, their re-
search efforts, so as to support a patenting strategy that encompasses 
both the “core” researched technologies and those that are closely re-
lated.  This in turn is likely to have the beneficial effect of encourag-
ing researchers to think beyond the narrow confines of present re-
search, and seek advantageous related technologies as well. 
Keeping Firms in the Patent System.  If nothing else, the emergence of 
patent portfolios suggests that engaging in the patent system is viewed 
as a worthwhile endeavor by most firms.  Thus, rather than resorting 
to trade secrecy or other means of protecting innovations, it appears 
that firms are increasingly participants in the patent system—
although, as this Article establishes, perhaps not in the way that is 
conventionally understood.  This in turn implies two possibilities:  (1) 
the fundamental social value of the patent system as an incentive to 
disclose inventions remains valid, and (2) policy changes to the patent 
system are likely to have substantial impact. 
267 See Wagner, supra note 226, at 1007 (noting how an invention, once disclosed, 
produces more information than the invention itself). 
268 In the Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent Applications Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501A-561, -561 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 
(2000)), Congress amended the practice in which pending applications remained con-
fidential by requiring that most patent applications be published eighteen months af-
ter their submission to the USPTO.
269 See supra Part II.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has set forth a new theory of patent value, responding 
to growing evidence—both empirical and theoretical—that the tradi-
tional appropriability theory of patents is fundamentally incomplete 
in the modern innovation environment.  We find that for patents, the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  The true value of patents 
lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a col-
lection of related patents—a patent portfolio. 
We find that the benefits of patent portfolios are so significant as 
to suggest that the decision by a firm to seek additional patents is es-
sentially unrelated to the expected value of the individual patents.  
Firms engaging in strategic patent portfolio building will, therefore, 
typically seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than 
evaluating their actual worth individually.  The result—which we find 
widely recognized in commercial circles—is that the modern patent-
ing environment exhibits (and requires) a high-volume, portfolio-
based approach that is at odds with scholars’ traditional assumptions. 
The implications of the patent portfolio theory are important and 
widespread.  First, the explanatory power of the theory allows resolu-
tion of not only “the patent paradox,” but many of the otherwise puz-
zling observable patterns in the modern patenting environment, such 
as firm-size differences in patent intensity and litigation rates.  Second, 
the patent portfolio theory neatly complements the prior theories that 
have sought to explain modern patent value, strengthening their rela-
tionship with the reality of patenting and confirming that the value of 
patents has expanded beyond traditionalist notions.  Third, the patent 
portfolio theory allows a number of important predictive insights into 
future trends in the patent system, allowing policymakers and scholars 
to frame the future problems within a range of likely outcomes.  Fi-
nally, our analysis of the patent portfolio theory does not suggest a 
better, brighter future for the patent system, but it does build a foun-
dation for the important policy-related work that springs from this ini-
tial theoretical treatment. 
 
